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ABSTRACT

We investigate how fertility relates to work from home (WFH) in the post-pandemic era, drawing on original data from our Global Survey of Working Arrangements and U.S. Survey of Working Arrangements and Attitudes. Realized fertility from 2023 to 2025 and future planned fertility are higher among adults who WFH at least one day a week and, for couples, higher yet when both partners do so. Estimated lifetime fertility is greater by 0.32 children per woman when both partners WFH one or more days per week as compared to the case where neither does. The implications for national fertility rates differ across countries due mainly to large differences in WFH rates. In a complementary analysis using other U.S. data before and after the pandemic, one-year fertility rates rise with WFH opportunities in one's own occupation and, for couples, in the partner's occupation.

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1 Introduction

Flexibility in when, where, and how to work – or the absence of such flexibility – is a potentially important factor in fertility decisions (Goldin, 2014, 2021). Jobs that allow work from home (WFH) typically offer more flexibility in these respects, making it easier for parents to combine child rearing with employment, and perhaps raising fertility. In this light, we investigate how realized and planned fertility relate to the WFH status of individuals and couples. In a complementary analysis, we investigate how fertility responds to WFH opportunities, as measured by WFH prevalence in own and partner’s occupation.

Our first analysis relies on new micro data from two surveys of our own design: The Global Survey of Working Arrangements (G-SWA), which covers 38 countries, and the U.S. Survey of Working Arrangements and Attitudes (SWAA). Both surveys include core questions on demographics, labor market outcomes, marital status, and working arrangements. The survey waves we exploit also contain questions about realized and planned fertility. We focus on respondents who are 20 to 45 years of age as of the survey date and consider three fertility measures: realized fertility from 2023 to early 2025, including children in gestation; plans for future fertility as of the survey date; and lifetime fertility defined as children ever born to, or fathered by, the respondent plus plans for future fertility.

Both datasets reveal clear evidence that realized fertility, plans for future fertility, and lifetime fertility are greater for respondents who WFH at least one day a week. These patterns hold in the raw data and when controlling for age, education, marital status, presence of children before 2023, own and partner’s employment status, and country or state fixed effects. They hold for male and female respondents separately. For couples, we find weaker evidence that fertility is greater when the partner works from home. When both partners WFH at least one day a week, lifetime fertility is greater by an estimated 14% (0.32 children per woman) than when neither does so in our 38-country dataset. It is 18% greater (0.45 children per woman) in SWAA data for the United States. Ours is the first study to develop clear evidence that WFH arrangements are associated with higher fertility across many countries.

What mechanisms might explain the positive relationship of fertility to WFH status in the household? We see three basic possibilities. First, a simple causal story: By making it easier to combine child-rearing with paid employment, WFH jobs lead women and their partners to choose higher fertility. Second, a pure selection story: Families with children choose jobs that offer WFH options, but fertility is insensitive to WFH status. Third, selection as a causal force: The availability of WFH jobs raises fertility by expanding current and future opportunities to select into parent-friendly jobs. All three stories align with the idea that WFH jobs make it easier for parents to combine child rearing and employment.

To develop evidence that more plausibly reflects causal effects, we investigate how individual-level fertility responds to WFH *opportunities* in the household. For this complementary analysis, we draw on the U.S. Current Population Survey and consider respondents who are 30 to 45 years old. The CPS yields data on fertility outcomes in the prior twelve months, the respondent’s (and partner’s) current or most recent occupation, and many other variables. To measure WFH opportunities, we use the occupation-level share of jobs that allow WFH one or more days per week from Hansen et al. (2026). They optimize a large language model to flag job postings that offer WFH at least one day a week and, in cooperation with Lightcast, apply the model to a near-universe of online job postings in the United States.

We find clear evidence that one-year fertility rates rise with WFH opportunities. This pattern holds after the pandemic (2023-25) and before the pandemic (2017-19). For a sense of magnitudes, consider female respondents with partners in the period from 2023 to 2025. Raising the own-occupation WFH share by one standard deviation (in the cross section of persons) raises the one-year fertility rate by 7.3% of sample mean fertility. The total effect of raising the WFH shares of the woman and her partner by unit standard deviations is to raise the one-year fertility rate by an estimated 14% of mean fertility.

We cannot rule out the possibility that a pure selection story (partly) underpins the response of individual fertility to own and partner’s WFH opportunities. However, most people settle into an occupation by age thirty, which is why we exclude younger respondents from the complementary analysis. For this reason, the pure selection story strikes us as an implausible explanation for the relationship of fertility to household-level WFH opportunities. Also, the unanticipated character of the COVID-19 pandemic implies that persons in their thirties and forties as of 2023-2025 did not choose occupational paths in 2020 or earlier with foreknowledge of WFH opportunities yet to emerge.

In Section 5, we offer a provisional assessment of how WFH affects fertility. In one exercise, we quantify the fertility impact of increasing the prevalence of WFH to the rate that prevails on average in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States as of 2025. Interpreted causally, our preferred estimates imply that expanding WFH to this extent would raise national fertility rates by about 4-5% in Japan and South Korea, and 2-3% in France, Germany, and Italy. In another exercise, we quantify the current contribution of WFH to national fertility. Interpreted causally, our SWAA-based results imply that WFH accounts for 8.1% of U.S. fertility, or about 291,000 births per year as of 2024. While seemingly modest, this contribution is greater than the fertility contribution of government spending on early childhood care and education in the United States, judging from available evidence.

Additional motivation and relationship to the literature

Our study draws inspiration from, and contributes to, two main areas of research – one

that considers how the compatibility of family and jobs affects fertility choices, and another that examines the social and economic consequences of the rise in WFH.

The economics literature on fertility goes back to [Becker \(1960\)](#). In reviewing a vast body of later research, [Doepke et al. \(2023, page 154\)](#) remark “A general theme in this new literature is that the compatibility of family and career has become a key determinant of fertility in high-income countries.” [Goldin \(2014\)](#), [Guner et al. \(2025\)](#) and [Harrington and Kahn \(2025\)](#), among others, stress the potential for flexibility in working arrangements to reduce the career costs of children. These studies provide one motivation for our examination of how fertility relates to WFH.

Another motivation involves the behavior of fertility itself. Fertility rates fell around the world in recent decades, to levels below the replacement rate in many countries ([Geruso and Spears, 2026](#)). The resulting demographic outlook is one of aging populations in nearly all countries, shrinking populations in many countries, and declines in global population. These demographic developments will place greater demands on healthcare systems and old-age support programs, straining government finances. They also present risks to innovation and economic growth ([Jones, 2022](#); [Kotschy and Bloom, 2023](#)). Our study speaks to the issue of whether WFH can partly undo past fertility declines or blunt further declines.

Previous research attributes fertility declines to better and more accessible contraception, rising opportunity costs of motherhood, rising time and money costs of childcare and education, the impact of rising incomes on the child quantity-quality tradeoff, and shifting priorities and social norms ([Adda et al., 2017](#); [Myong et al., 2021](#); [Kearney et al., 2022](#); [Bloom et al., 2024](#); [Bailey, 2025](#); [Kleven, 2025](#); [Kearney and Levine, 2025](#)). Partly motivated by fertility declines, governments have implemented policies to support reproductive health, promote marriage, subsidize births, provide early childhood care and education, and mandate or subsidize parental leave and job protection. Many of these interventions appear to have little or no effect on fertility. Others achieve modest fertility gains at high cost to taxpayers. See [Olivetti and Petrongolo \(2017\)](#), [Bokun \(2024\)](#), [Vignoli and Guetto \(2025\)](#) and [Gauthier and Gietel-Basten \(2025\)](#) for reviews of an extensive literature. Outright cash subsidies for births and young children raise fertility in the near term, but their implications for lifetime fertility are less clear ([Kearney and Levine, 2025](#)).

We also contribute to a literature on the economic and social ramifications of WFH. [Aksoy et al. \(2022, 2025\)](#), among others, document the large, lasting shift to WFH in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and the wide variation in WFH rates across countries. Previous research finds important effects of WFH on time use, productivity, pay, hiring practices, the sorting of workers to jobs, residential location choices, real estate prices, and other outcomes. See [Barrero et al. \(2023a\)](#), [Akan et al. \(2025\)](#), [Bagga et al. \(2025\)](#), [Gupta et al. \(2025\)](#), [Choi](#)

[et al. \(2026\)](#) and references therein. A consistent finding is the strong concentration of WFH among college-educated persons, high earners, and professional and technical occupations. Thus, any effects of WFH on fertility are likely to be highly uneven across education groups, occupations, and industries as well as countries. [Bailey et al. \(2023\)](#) find relative gains in birth rates for college-educated American women in 2021, a group that saw greater increases in WFH opportunities when the COVID-19 pandemic struck.

Contemporaneous research by [Lu et al. \(2025\)](#) treats the COVID-19 pandemic as an exogenous shock to remote work adoption to estimate its effects on fertility. Using CPS and American Community Survey data, they conclude that the WFH adoption shock raised fertility, especially among college-educated women between 25 and 34 years of age. Notably, they find that WFH raises fertility mainly through its effects on higher-order births. Section 5.5 below discusses other studies of how WFH and other flexible working arrangements relate to fertility and the tradeoff between family and jobs.

2 Data Sources and Measures

2.1 The Global Survey of Working Arrangements

We launched the Global Survey of Working Arrangements (G-SWA) in 2021 to measure practices, preferences, perceptions, constraints, and attitudes related to WFH as well as demographics, living arrangements, and labor market outcomes. Wave 4 of the G-SWA went to field in 38 countries from November 2024 to February 2025. It includes a new module on fertility outcomes, plans, and preferences.¹ We enlisted professionals to translate our English-language questionnaire into each country’s major languages, and we also commissioned an independent third party familiar with the survey to review and revise translations as needed.

We contract with Bilendi, a professional survey firm widely used in the social sciences, to administer the survey. Bilendi and its partners draw from pre-recruited panels of individuals who have previously agreed to participate in survey research. Recruitment into these panels occurs via partner affiliate networks, multiple advertising channels, address databases, and referrals. New panel recruits are added on a regular basis. When fielding a survey, Bilendi or its partner sends email invitations that state compensation and estimated completion time, but not the survey topic. Clicking on the link in an invitation opens an online questionnaire. Respondents who complete the survey receive cash, vouchers, or award points, which they can donate if they wish.² [Aksoy et al. \(2022, 2025\)](#), and [Zarate et al. \(2025\)](#) provide more

¹The full survey instrument for G-SWA Wave 4 is reproduced in the appendix to [Aksoy et al. \(2025\)](#).

²We do not contact respondents ourselves, do not collect personally identifiable information, and have no way to re-contact them.

information about the G-SWA.

Wave 4 includes two independently drawn samples in each country – one that covers adults 20-64 years of age, and another that covers full-time workers with at least a secondary education. These two samples are of equal size in a given country, but sample size varies across countries. Sampling quotas target gender, age, and education distributions by country. Here, we use only the broader samples that cover all adults 20-64 years of age.

To build our fertility analysis sample, we start with the 25,076 respondents in these broader samples. We drop “speeders,” defined as respondents in the bottom 5% of the completion-time distribution in each country, and another 17% of respondents who fail an attention check.³ That leaves us with 19,277 usable observations, and 11,314 for respondents 20-45 years of age. Appendix Table A.1 reports observation counts and response-time statistics by country. Our samples are broadly representative with respect to age, gender, and education for persons aged 20–64 in most countries, as indicated by Table A.2.⁴ Table A.3 reports summary statistics for our G-SWA fertility analysis sample.

Our sample misses births to female respondents younger than 20 but captures births to male respondents 20 and older regardless of the mother’s age. The force of this asymmetry depends on (a) the teenage birth share and (b) age gaps between mothers and fathers. To assess these matters, we turn to external sources of information. As of 2023, women under 20 account for five percent or less of births in 29 of our 38 countries and 8-10% in Argentina, Egypt, Romania, The Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. They account for 12.7 percent in Brazil, 16.5 percent in Mexico, and 11.5 percent in South Africa (Table A.4). The mean age gap between husbands and wives ranges from two to four years in our sample, except for Egypt (6.4 years). Taken together, these statistics suggest that missing births to women under twenty are not a serious concern for our analysis, except possibly for Egypt.

2.2 The Survey of Working Arrangements and Attitudes

The Survey of Working Arrangements and Attitudes (SWAA) is a monthly survey of U.S. residents, aged 20 to 64. In addition to questions on demographics, employment, industry, occupation and earnings, the survey asks about current and past working arrangements, as well as personal experiences, attitudes, and preferences related to WFH. In recent years,

³The survey terminates automatically for respondents who fail to correctly answer the screening question “What is 3+4?” We also drop respondents who fail the following attention check: “In how many big cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants have you lived? Irrespective of the truth, please insert the number 33 in order to continue with the survey.”

⁴Respondents take the survey on a computer, smart-phone, iPad or like device, so we miss persons who don’t use such devices. In some countries, our samples contain too few respondents who have not obtained a secondary educational degree as it can be hard to reach those people in online panels.

many (but not all) SWAA waves include the same fertility module as Wave 4 in the G-SWA. Indeed, the SWAA serves as a model and testing ground for G-SWA questions.⁵

After dropping speeders and respondents who fail attention check questions, we re-weight the SWAA data using an iterative proportional fitting (raking) algorithm to match the distribution of respondents by age, sex, education, partner status, region, and employment status in Current Population Survey data from 2021 to 2024. Our SWAA-based fertility analysis sample has 135,949 usable observations on SWAA respondents from December 2022 to December 2025. Appendix Table A.5 reports summary statistics for the SWAA sample. We have 89,886 observations on respondents who are 20-45 years of age.

2.3 Measures of Work from Home in the SWAA and G-SWA

We ask each SWAA and G-SWA respondent whether he or she worked for pay last week. If yes, we follow with: “For each day **last week**, did you **work a full day (6 or more hours)**, and if so **where?**” The respondent then picks, for each day, one of three options: “Worked **from home**” or “Worked at **employer or client sites**” or “Did not work 6 or more hours.” This design elicits the respondent’s main location of work activity on each full paid workday in the previous week.

We use the resulting data to construct two WFH measures for each individual: A 0-1 indicator for whether the respondent had at least one full WFH day last week, and the number of full WFH days from 0 to 7. We proceed similarly for the spouse or domestic partner, using a more compact question design: “What is your **spouse or domestic partner’s current working status?** The response options are “Working from home 1 to 2 days per week,” “Working from home 3 to 4 days per week,” “Working from home 5+ days per week,” “Working all days on business premises,” and options for not working. For a comparative analysis of several WFH measures and question designs, see [Buckman et al. \(2025\)](#).

2.4 Fertility Measures in the SWAA and G-SWA

We consider three fertility measures in our analyses using SWAA and G-SWA data. The first is realized fertility from 2023 to 2025, inclusive of children in gestation, as of the survey date. We set children in gestation to one if the respondent answers “Yes” to “Are you currently expecting a baby?”, and zero otherwise. In practice, the number of children in gestation is small and matters little for our results. We ask about year of birth for each child born since 2015, which is how we sort current children by year of birth.

⁵Monthly SWAA questionnaires are at <https://wfhresearch.com/survey-design-and-question-repository/>.

Our second measure is future planned fertility as of the survey date. To obtain this quantity, we first ask “Do you plan to have your own (biological) children someday?” if the respondent has no biological children, or “Do you plan to have another (biological) child someday?” if the respondent already has at least one biological child. The response options are “Yes,” “No,” and “Don’t know.” If the respondent selects “Yes,” we follow with, respectively: “How many biological children do you plan to have in total?” or “How many more biological children do you plan to have in total?”

Our third measure is total (lifetime) fertility, computed as the sum of biological children to date, children in gestation, and planned fertility. This measure and our planned fertility measure rely on expressed intentions to quantify future fertility rates.

2.5 Occupation-Level WFH Opportunities

Section 3 below considers how fertility relates to individual- and household-level WFH *status*. Section 4, in contrast, considers how fertility responds to WFH *opportunities* in someone’s occupation. Specifically, we set each person’s opportunity value to the share of job postings in his or her occupation that advertises the ability to WFH one or more days a week.

We obtain these occupation-level values at <https://WFHmap.com> from [Hansen et al. \(2026\)](#). They tailor a large language model (LLM) to classify the WFH status of job vacancy postings. Their LLM reads the text of each vacancy posting to assess whether the job offers the ability to WFH one or more days a week, achieving a 99 percent accuracy rate in a large-scale human audit. Working with Lightcast, they apply the model to half a billion postings across five English-speaking countries from January 2014 onwards.

Their statistics have three useful features for our purposes. First, they yield WFH opportunity shares for hundreds of distinct occupations that are readily mapped to occupations in the Current Population Survey. Second, their measure reflects extant WFH opportunities in the marketplace rather than a technical assessment of whether certain jobs could be performed in a (fully) remote capacity, as in [Dingel and Neiman \(2020\)](#). Third, the Hansen et al. measures track opportunities to WFH one or more days a week. As we show below, this concept of WFH incidence is more strongly associated with fertility outcomes than the number of WFH days per week.

2.6 Current Population Survey Data and Fertility Measure

The U.S. Current Population Survey (CPS) is a monthly household survey. It follows a 4-8-4 rotation structure, so that each household’s respondent can be interviewed up to eight times over a 16-month window. To build an individual-level dataset, we start with each respondent’s

last monthly interview in the period from 2023 to 2025. If the respondent reports a spouse or domestic partner, we append data for that person as well. If the respondent has a child under age one as of the last monthly interview, we set our CPS fertility indicator to 1.

The CPS elicits the current occupation of employed individuals. If not employed in the reference week, the survey elicits the occupation of the person’s last job in the prior five years. If the occupation variable is missing (because, for example, the respondent had no job in the prior five years), we turn to the most recent non-missing occupation for that individual. In this way, we capture the occupation of the last job for up to six years in the past. Given the six-digit CPS occupational classification, we use the crosswalk in [Hansen et al. \(2026\)](#) to assign an occupation-level WFH opportunity value. When there is no one-to-one mapping at the six-digit level, we aggregate to the five-digit level. This approach yields usable WFH opportunity values that range from zero to 42% across 514 distinct occupations.

Our CPS extract for persons 30 to 45 in calendar years 2023 to 2025 contains about 157,000 respondents. Nearly 139,000 have non-missing values for own occupation, and 137,000 remain after dropping those who cannot be matched to occupations in Hansen et al. When focusing on respondents with a spouse or domestic partner with a non-missing occupation value, we have about 79,000 usable observations. See appendix table [A.6](#) for more detail.

Occupational mobility exhibits a strong life-cycle pattern, as shown in [Figure A.2](#). Persons who switch occupations from one year to the next falls from about 20% for those in their early twenties to 11% of men and 12% of women ages 30 to 45. That is, nearly nine-in-ten persons 30 to 45 of age don’t switch occupations from one year to the next.

3 WFH Status and Fertility Outcomes

3.1 How Time-Series Evidence Informs Our Approach

Remote work surged in reaction to COVID-19 and receded as the pandemic subsided, but to much higher levels than before 2020 ([Barrero et al., 2023a](#)). By 2023, WFH rates had stabilized globally ([Aksoy et al., 2025](#)). Monthly statistics for the United States show a huge spike in WFH rates in spring 2020, followed by declining WFH rates through early 2023, and small fluctuations in a narrow band since then ([Barrero et al., 2026](#)).

This time-series evidence informs our empirical approach in two ways. First, the health shocks, contagion concerns, social distancing, and uncertainties associated with the pandemic had possibly important effects on fertility.⁶ We have no ready way to disentangle such effects

⁶See [Dryhurst et al. \(2020\)](#) on perceived health risks and behavioral responses during the pandemic, [Barrero et al. \(2023b\)](#) on social distancing behaviors and their relationship to contagion concerns, and [Altig et al. \(2020\)](#) on economic uncertainty during the pandemic.

from those associated with WFH. Hence, we do not rely on fertility data from 2020 to 2022 to draw inferences about the WFH-fertility relationship. Second, fertility choices are forward-looking and may respond differently to temporary shocks than to a persistent change in working arrangements (Chen et al., 2023). The durability of the pandemic-induced rise in WFH was not evident in 2020 and perhaps not even in 2021 and 2022. By 2023, it had become apparent that WFH rates would not revert to pre-pandemic levels. Thus, data from 2023 onward are more informative about the longer-term WFH-fertility relationship.

3.2 Summary Statistics on WFH and Fertility

Figure 1 reports the share of workers, ages 20-45, who WFH 1+ days a week in our data. This share ranges from 0.21 in Japan to 0.6 in Vietnam. So, each country has many workers who WFH sometimes and many who never WFH. By this measure, WFH is relatively uncommon in Japan, South Korea, and many European countries. It is common in Canada and the United Kingdom and in several low-income countries with high rural population shares such as Egypt, The Phillippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Vietnam. Rural workers often engage in farming, craft work, and small-scale production activities that take place at or near home. Figure A.1 shows a broadly similar pattern for mean WFH days by country.

Figure 2 displays histograms over respondents of lifetime fertility (realized + planned) for persons 20-45 years of age. In both the G-SWA and SWAA datasets, many respondents report a planned family size of 0, 1, 2 or 3 children, and others plan to have 4 or more children. Figure 3 shows the raw relationship of lifetime fertility to WFH status for persons who live with a spouse or domestic partner. Fertility is lowest when neither partner works from home and highest when both partners do so.

Mean fertility differences by household-level WFH status are large. For example, among women respondents in our 38-country sample, mean lifetime fertility is 2.09 when neither partner works from home, 2.43 when only the respondent works from home, and 2.55 when she and her partner WFH. Of course, these unconditional means could reflect other factors that affect fertility and correlate with household WFH status. In the next section, we investigate how fertility relates to WFH status conditional on a rich set of controls.

3.3 Empirical Specifications

Our baseline specification for estimating the conditional relationship of fertility measures to household-level WFH status has the form:

$$Y_i = \theta MS_i + \beta_1 WFH_i^{Own} + \beta_2 WFH_{p(i)}^{Par} + X_i^{Own} \delta^{Own} + X_{p(i)}^{Par} \delta^{Par} + \mu + \varepsilon_i, \quad (1)$$

where Y_i is fertility of respondent i , $MS_i = 1$ if i has a spouse or domestic partner and 0 otherwise, $WFH_i^{Own} \equiv \mathbf{1}(\text{Own WFH Days}_i \geq 1)$ and $WFH_{p(i)}^{Par} \equiv \mathbf{1}(\text{Partner WFH Days}_i \geq 1)$ are indicators for own and partner’s WFH status, respectively, X_i^{Own} is a vector of other controls for respondent i , $X_{p(i)}^{Par}$ is a vector of controls for the respondent’s partner, μ denotes country or state fixed effects, and ε_i is an error term. The baseline X vector includes survey month indicators and controls for the respondent’s age (five-year bins), current employment status, and education (four categories).⁷ We also control for the current employment status of the respondent’s partner. For respondents with no partner, we set $WFH_{p(i)}^{Par}$ and partner control variables to zero. We estimate (1) by OLS on the G-SWA sample, pooled over 38 countries, and separately on the U.S. SWAA sample. When calculating standard errors, we cluster errors at the country level in the G-SWA and at the state level in the SWAA.

3.4 Results

Tables 1–6 report estimation results for (1) and simpler specifications. Each table has four columns for women respondents and four for men. Tables 1 and 2 consider realized fertility from 2023 to 2025 as the outcome of interest, Tables 3 and 4 consider plans for future fertility, and Tables 5 and 6 consider lifetime fertility. Columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) in each table treat respondents as individuals and ignore marital status and partner characteristics. The other columns adopt a household perspective. For the sake of brevity, we focus our remarks on the results for specifications that include controls.

Realized fertility from 2023 to 2025: Women who WFH 1+ days per week in our G-SWA sample had 0.037 more children from 2023 to 2025 than women who don’t WFH, conditional on our baseline controls, as reported in column (2) of Table 1. This difference is statistically significant at the 5% level and large relative to mean realized fertility of 0.150 in the sample. The positive relationship between WFH status and realized fertility also holds for men in the G-SWA sample, but the coefficient on the WFH indicator is only two-thirds as large, as reported in column (6).

Realized fertility varies more with own WFH status in the SWAA. American women who WFH 1+ days per week had 0.091 more children from 2023 to 2025 than women who don’t WFH, conditional on our baseline controls (column (2) in Table 2). This coefficient is statistically significant and roughly one-third as large as the sample mean realized fertility. The coefficient on own WFH status is also large and significant for American men.

Turning to specifications that adopt a household-level perspective, we again find that own

⁷In the G-SWA regressions, education is coded as primary, secondary, tertiary, and graduate. In the SWAA analysis, we distinguish high school, 1–3 years of college, 4-year college, and graduate education. We do not have data on partner’s education in the SWAA.

WFH status is associated with greater fertility. The coefficient on own WFH status is now a bit smaller but remains statistically significant, as seen in columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) of Tables 1 and 2. The coefficient on partner’s WFH status is positive but insignificant in the G-SWA. For American men, own WFH status and partner’s WFH status are both strongly predictive of higher realized fertility. Consider column (8) in Table 2: Men who WFH 1+ days a week have 0.070 more children from 2023 to 2025 than observationally similar men who don’t WFH. If his partner also WFH 1+ days a week, realized fertility is greater yet by 0.058 children.

Unsurprisingly, both samples show strong evidence that men and women with partners have greater fertility. In the G-SWA data, men respondents have lower realized fertility when their spouses work for pay. This effect is two or three times larger than the point estimates associated with own and partner’s WFH status. In the G-SWA, the profile of a man with high fertility from 2023 to 2025 is married, employed, works from home 1+ days a week, and has a partner who doesn’t work for pay. In partial contrast, the profile of an American man with high fertility is married, employed, works from home 1+ days a week, and has a partner who also works from home 1+ days a week.⁸ For women, the negative association of fertility to paid work is largely offset when the woman works from home 1+ days a week. Women’s fertility is also higher when her partner works for pay, but this effect is not statistically significant in the G-SWA data.

Plans for future fertility: Tables 3 and 4 report how plans for future fertility relate to WFH status. For women respondents in the G-SWA sample, planned fertility levels are higher when she works from home 1+ days a week and higher yet when her partner does so. Both effects are large and statistically significant, as reported in column (4) of Table 3. The results are directionally similar for men in the G-SWA, but the results are weaker in the sense of statistical significance. There is stronger evidence that own and partner’s WFH status are associated with higher fertility plans for American women and men in the SWAA data, as reported in Table 4.

Lifetime fertility (children to date + planned): All specifications and samples in Tables 5 and 6 yield strong evidence that lifetime fertility is higher when the respondent WFH 1+ days a week. For example, lifetime fertility for G-SWA respondents who WFH is greater by 0.25 children for women and 0.23 for men, conditional on controls, as reported in columns (2) and (5) in Table 5. These coefficient values are sizable relative to the sample mean lifetime fertility of 1.97. In specifications that adopt a household-level perspective, the G-SWA data continue to point to higher lifetime fertility when the respondent WFH 1+ days a week and higher yet when his or her partner does so.

⁸See columns (7) and (8) in Table 2.

Once again, fertility is more sensitive to WFH status when estimating (1) on SWAA data. For example, American women who WFH 1+ days per week plan 0.404 more children over their lifetimes than women who don't WFH, conditional on controls. See column (2) in Table 6. For American men, the coefficient on own WFH status is 0.312. Turning to specifications that adopt a household-level perspective, both own and partner's WFH status are strongly predictive of lifetime fertility for American women and men.

Specifications with number of WFH days per week: When we replace $WFH_i^{\text{Own}} \equiv \mathbf{1}(\text{Own WFH Days}_i \geq 1)$ and $WFH_{p(i)}^{\text{Par}} \equiv \mathbf{1}(\text{Partner WFH Days}_i \geq 1)$ in equation (1) with counterparts that are linear in the number of WFH days a week, we obtain weaker results. Table A.11, for example, reports how lifetime fertility relates to linear WFH variables in the G-SWA and SWAA datasets. Moreover, when running horse races, the coefficients on the linear WFH variables are small and statistically insignificant or wrong-signed. In contrast, the coefficients on WFH_i^{Own} and $WFH_{p(i)}^{\text{Par}}$ remain positive and sizable in the estimated horse-race specifications, and the coefficient on WFH_i^{Own} is often statistically significant. See Table A.12. Given the ability to WFH at least one day a week, we find no evidence that fertility rises with each extra WFH day.

Summary of magnitudes: Table 7 draws on Tables 5 and 6 to summarize how lifetime fertility varies with household-level WFH status. Panel (1) reports sample mean values of lifetime fertility. The other panels report regression-predicted differences associated with own and partner's WFH status, conditional on controls. Panel (4), in particular, reports regression-predicted differences between households in which the respondent and partner both WFH 1+ days a week and households in which neither does so. These differences are large – 0.32 children per woman in the 38-country G-SWA (14.3% of mean fertility), and 0.45 children per woman in SWAA data for the United States (17.5% of mean fertility).⁹ These results establish that WFH arrangements are associated with large fertility differences across households. This pattern holds across our many-country G-SWA sample and is even stronger in our SWAA data for the United States.

3.5 *Some* WFH as the Key Covariate

As remarked above, *some* ability to WFH over the week is the key feature of working arrangements that correlates with fertility. Conditional on at least one WFH day in the week, extra WFH days are not associated with higher fertility. This aspect of our results suggests that modest increases in WFH intensity, when spread broadly across many workers, have the most potential to support fertility.

⁹The fertility differences associated with WFH status are larger for men respondents, perhaps due to the asymmetry between men and women in our fertility coverage, as discussed in Section 2.1.

This finding also speaks to the nature of potential mechanisms behind the positive relationship of fertility to WFH status. If each extra WFH day relaxes household management and child-rearing costs by the same amount (and imposes the same cost in terms of foregone pay and career advancement), we would expect the linear WFH days per week covariate to dominate the indicator variable for 1+ WFH days. Alternatively, if the marginal benefits of WFH in household management and child rearing fall sharply with WFH days per week (or if the marginal pay and career costs rise sharply with WFH days per week), we would expect the indicator variable to dominate. Since the indicator variable dominates and the indicator-based specifications outperform the linear ones, our results suggest that the marginal benefits of WFH fall rapidly with the number of WFH days per week, or that the marginal costs in terms of foregone pay and career development rise rapidly, or both.

Other evidence support this interpretation. For example, when asked to identify up to three top benefits of working from home, 39% of SWAA respondents select “Flexible work schedule” (Barrero et al., 2026). Working from home two days a week, for example, makes it much easier to coordinate with plumbers or electricians for home repairs, accompany a child to the dentist, or attend to the occasional child illness. Indeed, parents with children in the household express greater willingness to pay for the option to WFH two days a week (Aksoy et al., 2022; Barrero et al., 2023a). It also seems likely that any foregone pay, career advancement, networking, and social benefits of hybrid working arrangements are much smaller than those associated with fully remote work. Even in the post-pandemic era, hybrid arrangements are much more common than fully remote work (Barrero et al., 2023a).

4 How Fertility Responds to WFH Opportunities

We now consider how fertility in the past twelve months responds to occupation-level WFH opportunities, as quantified by the share of job openings that explicitly offer the ability to WFH 1+ days a week. The approach in this section lets us exploit pre-pandemic as well as post-pandemic data. For the post-pandemic period, we consider data from 2023 to 2025, which roughly corresponds to the period considered in Section 3. For the pre-pandemic period, we consider data from 2017 to 2019.

4.1 A Graphical Look

Figure 4 displays a bin scatter of individual-level fertility against the natural log of the respondent’s occupation-level WFH opportunities. One-year fertility rates rise with occupation-level WFH opportunities for both women and men. Figure 5 shows that this relationship also

holds in the pre-pandemic data. We turn next to a more structured investigation of how one-year fertility rates respond to occupation-level WFH opportunities.

4.2 Empirical Specification

Our baseline specification for estimating how one-year fertility responds to household-level WFH opportunities has the form:

$$Y_i = \theta MS_i + \gamma_1 OccWFH_i + \gamma_2 OccWFH_{p(i)} + X_i^{Own} \delta^{Own} + X_{p(i)}^{Par} \delta^{Par} + \lambda_t + e_i, \quad (2)$$

where Y_i is the fertility indicator for respondent i , $MS_i = 1$ if i has a spouse or domestic partner and 0 otherwise, $OccWFH_i$ and $OccWFH_{p(i)}$ are the shares (or log shares) of job postings that offer WFH options in the respondent’s and partner’s occupation, respectively, X_i^{Own} and $X_{p(i)}^{Par}$ are vectors of controls for the respondent and partner, λ_t is a fixed effect for calendar year t , and e_i is an error term. The individual-level controls include one-year age fixed effects. In constructing the $OccWFH$ variables, we average over monthly values from January 2017 to December 2019 in the pre-pandemic period and from January 2023 to September 2025 in the post-pandemic period.

We estimate (2) by least squares using CPS sampling weights and cluster errors at the respondent’s occupation level. As before, we also consider simpler specifications that treat respondents as individuals while ignoring marital status and partner characteristics.

4.3 Fertility Responses to Occupation-Level WFH Opportunities

Table 8 reports estimation results for (2) and simpler specifications using CPS data from 2023 to 2025. Panel A considers specifications that involve the log of the occupation-level WFH propensity, and Panel B considers the corresponding linear specifications. Columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) treat respondents as individuals and ignore partner characteristics. Other columns adopt a household perspective. As before, we report results separately for men and women and focus on specifications with controls.

Every specification and sample in Table 8 yields evidence that one-year fertility rises with the own-occupation share of WFH jobs. Consider, first, specifications that treat respondents as individuals in samples of all persons 30-45 years of age. According to columns (2) and (6) in Panel A, a unit standard deviation increase in the own-occupation WFH share raises one-year fertility by 7.3% of its mean for women and 6.1% for men.¹⁰ These effects might

¹⁰Calculated as $(0.0135)(0.201)/0.0373$ for women and $(0.0141)(0.180)/0.0414$ for men using statistics reported in columns (2) and (5), respectively.

seem small, but they are sizable relative to cross-sectional fertility variation. They equal 38% of the cross-sectional standard deviation in one-year fertility for women and 31% for men.

Fertility is more responsive to own-occupation WFH opportunities among partnered respondents. To see this point, compare columns (2) and (4) or (6) and (8) in Table 8. Fertility also rises with WFH opportunities in the partner’s occupation. For a sense of magnitudes, consider the effects of raising both own and partner’s occupational WFH shares by unit standard deviations. Sticking to Panel A, the estimated total effect of this expansion in household WFH opportunities is to raise one-year fertility by 16% of mean fertility for women and 13% for men. These effects are 72% as large as the cross-sectional standard deviation of one-year fertility for partnered women and 56% as large for partnered men.

The linear specifications in Panel B of Table 8 fit nearly as well as the log-linear specifications, and they yield essentially the same quantitative implications. We omit a detailed discussion for the sake of brevity. Using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the dependent variable also yields very similar results, as reported in Table A.13. Finally, Tables 9 and A.14 report corresponding results based on data from 2017 to 2019. Once again, we find the same pattern. The coefficients on the chief variables of interest are even larger in the pre-pandemic period. Of course, the mean and standard deviation of occupation-level WFH opportunities are much smaller before the pandemic.

In sum, in both the pre-pandemic and post-pandemic periods and across a variety of specifications, we find evidence that differences across persons and households in occupation-level WFH opportunities are important sources of cross-sectional fertility variation. Our results suggest that expanded WFH opportunities support higher fertility levels. We develop this point in the next section.

5 WFH and Fertility: A Provisional Assessment

We now offer an assessment of how WFH affects, and could affect, national fertility outcomes. To do so, we draw on the evidence in Sections 3 and 4 and other studies of how WFH influences fertility and alters the tradeoffs between family and work. Our discussion is speculative in places, and the evidence informing our assessment is imperfect and subject to revision. Though provisional, we hope our assessment is useful and spurs other efforts to better understand the impact of working arrangements on fertility outcomes.

5.1 WFH Contributions to lifetime fertility

To assess the actual and potential contributions of WFH to national fertility in the post-pandemic era, we combine four types of information:

- *TFR*: total fertility rates in 2024, as reported in [United Nations \(2025\)](#).
- *LFPR*: Labor force participation rates of women, ages 25-54, in 2024, as reported in [International Labour Organization \(2025\)](#).
- *WFHsh*: The share of employed women who WFH 1+ days a week in the 2023-25 period, using SWAA data for the United States and G-SWA data for other countries.
- β : The lifetime fertility response when a woman works from home one or more days a week, as compared to the situation where she is employed but does not WFH.

For the United States, we set this lifetime fertility response to 0.404, the estimated coefficient on $\mathbf{1}(\text{Paid Days WFH} \geq 1)$ in column (2) of Table 6. For other countries, we set it to 0.249, the coefficient on $\mathbf{1}(\text{Paid Days WFH} \geq 1)$ in column (2) of Table 5.¹¹

Given these ingredients, we calculate the accounting contribution of WFH to country c 's TFR in the post-pandemic era as:

$$\text{WFH Contribution to } TFR_c = \beta_c [WFHsh_c \times LFPR_c] \quad (3)$$

If we interpret β_c as a treatment effect and the bracketed term as a treated share, equation (3) answers the question: How much lower would national fertility be with no WFH?

Table 10 reports the national fertility rate for selected countries in column (1), key inputs to equation (3) in columns (2) and (3), and the estimated WFH contribution to TFR in column (4). Measured in lifetime fertility units, this WFH contribution ranges from 0.037 children per woman in Italy and 0.038 in Japan to 0.101 in Canada and 0.131 in the United States. Measured as a percent of TFR, the WFH contribution ranges from 3.1% in Japan and Italy to 7.6% in Canada and 8.1% in the United States.

The overall prevalence of WFH jobs in the economy could influence fertility beyond the direct effects of individual and household-level WFH status. The calculations in Table 10 don't capture this "missing intercept" term, because our regression-based estimates of β_c rely entirely on cross-sectional variation. Economic reasoning suggests that this missing term has

¹¹We rely on external sources for TFR and LFPR, given the limited size of our G-SWA dataset and concerns about its representativeness in some countries. We rely on SWAA-based estimates of β_c and *WFHsh* for the United States, because the size and quality of the SWAA data support more precise inferences and because the U.S. fertility response to WFH may differ from the many-country average response in the G-SWA. The G-SWA samples are not large enough to support reliable country-specific β_c estimates.

a positive sign in our setting, because more abundant WFH options – now and in the future – are likely to encourage fertility conditional on the observed individual circumstances. In short, insofar as the assessments in Table 10 suffer from a missing intercept problem, they are likely to understate the WFH contribution to national fertility rates.

These results and remarks support two conclusions. First, the extent of WFH in the post-pandemic era yields a material boost in national fertility. Consider the U.S. case, where WFH makes the largest contribution to TFR. There were about 3.6 million births in the United States in 2024, and WFH accounts for 291,000 (8.1%) of them. Given that U.S. WFH rates in 2024 are three-to-four times their pre-pandemic levels (Barrero et al., 2023a), our results also suggest that the United States had 200,000 or more extra births in 2024 relative to a counter-factual scenario with no pandemic-instigated rise in WFH.

Second, WFH contributions to TFR outcomes vary widely across countries. Recall that, in calculating these contributions, we use the same value of β_c for all countries except the United States. Hence, the national differences in WFH contributions to TFR arise mainly from the bracketed term in equation (3). Inspecting columns (2) and (3) in Table 10 reveals that variation in the bracketed term mainly reflects differences in the share of employed women who WFH. This observation suggests that some countries could raise fertility by expanding the prevalence of WFH. We return to this point below.

5.2 An Alternative Approach

We now quantify the WFH contribution to U.S. fertility using the estimated coefficient on $OccWFH_i$ in specification (2). This estimate is 0.028, as reported in column (2) of Panel B in Table 8. Recall that it’s based on CPS data from 2023 to 2025 for women 30-45 years old. For this coefficient value, a counterfactual scenario with no WFH implies a 7.1% reduction in the one-year U.S. fertility rate.¹² Multiplying by 3.6 million as before implies that WFH accounts for 254,000 U.S. births in 2024. Analogous calculations using the results in Table A.13 for the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation imply that WFH accounts for 261,000 U.S. births in 2024. These counterfactual calculations based on CPS data and specification (2) are close to the estimate based on SWAA data and specification (1).

The alternative approach to estimating the WFH contribution to fertility has two attractive features. First, it’s based on CPS data, which are widely used for government statistics and empirical studies. Second, it rests on the empirical relationship of individual-level fertility outcomes to occupation-level opportunities rather than their relationship to individual-level WFH status. Since a woman’s occupation-level WFH opportunities are less under her control

¹²Calculated as $100(0.028)(0.0941)/0.0373$, using quantities reported in Panel B column (2) of Table 8.

than her WFH status, it’s reasonable to see the quantification derived from specification (2) as less subject to selection bias than the one derived from specification (1). Both approaches are subject to the missing intercept issue discussed above.

5.3 The Potential for Expanded WFH to Raise Fertility

WFH is more common in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada than in other high-income countries. This observation raises a natural and important question: If WFH were as common in other high-income countries, what would be the implications for fertility? We can use our results to provide a rough, first-pass set of answers to this question.

Averaging over the United States, United Kingdom and Canada, the percentage of women 20-45 who WFH 1+ days a week circa 2024 is 0.453. Treating this value as a benchmark of what’s practical in a modern, high-income country, we compute the extra fertility associated with raising WFH to this benchmark as

$$(\text{Extra Fertility})_c = \beta_c[(0.453 - WFHsh_c) \times LFPR_c], \quad (4)$$

where c indexes countries as before, and all other quantities are defined as before. We calculate (4) and report the results in Table 10. Column (6) expresses the results in lifetime fertility units, and column (7) expresses them as a percentage of each country’s TFR.

The results show that increasing country-level WFH shares to the benchmark value would raise fertility by modest but nontrivial amounts. The fertility gains are greatest in countries that currently have low WFH shares. For example, the fertility gain for Japan equals 0.057 children per woman (4.6% of its actual TFR), which implies 31,800 extra births per year.¹³ The fertility gain for South Korea is 0.033 children per woman (4.4%), which translates to about 10,500 extra births per year.¹⁴ The fertility gains are also nontrivial in France and Italy – 0.042 and 0.042, respectively, which translate to an extra 17,000 births per year in France and an extra 12,800 extra per year in Italy.¹⁵

¹³Japan’s had about 686,000 births in 2024 (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (Japan), 2024), and its TFR was 1.23. Assuming annual births are proportional to TFR, we calculate extra births as $686,061 \times (0.057/1.23)$.

¹⁴South Korea had 238,300 births in 2024 (Statistics Korea (KOSTAT), 2024).

¹⁵France had 663,000 births in 2024 (Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (Insee), 2025), and Italy had about 370,000 (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (Istat), 2025).

5.4 Comparison to the Fertility Contributions of Early Childhood Care and Education

[Olivetti and Petrongolo \(2017\)](#) provide evidence on how total fertility relates to various family-friendly and pro-natalist policies. Using annual data for 22 high-income countries from 1970 to 2010, they find that extra government spending on early childhood care and education equal to one percent of GDP is “associated with 0.2 extra children per woman” (page 221). This result reflects a regression specification that includes country and year effects and controls for several other policies. They also report that actual expenditures on early childhood care and education in their sample circa 2013 range from 0.1% of GDP in Greece to 2.0% in Denmark, with most countries below 1% of GDP.

Government spending on early childhood care and education in the United States is 0.4% of GDP (as of 2013). Thus, interpreted causally, the evidence in [Olivetti and Petrongolo](#) suggests that this type of government spending contributes to U.S. total fertility in the amount of 0.08 children per woman. That is considerably less than the estimated WFH contribution of 0.13 children per woman reported in [Table 10](#). The story differs somewhat in many other high-income countries because of higher spending on early childhood care and education, lower WFH rates, or both. Given the limitations of the evidence, we tentatively conclude that WFH contributions to national fertility in the post-pandemic era are of the same order magnitude as the contributions of government spending on early childhood care and education, but their relative contributions vary across countries.

5.5 Other Evidence on How Working Arrangements Influence the Tradeoff between Work and Family

Several other studies suggest that better work-life balance, potentially enhanced by workplace flexibility, can raise fertility. In an experimental study in Singapore, [Wang and Dong \(2024\)](#) find that flexible working arrangements have a positive causal effect on fertility intentions among young and unmarried people, with stronger effects for women. In Japan, [Chong and Noguchi \(2024\)](#) report an increase in odds (albeit insignificant) of being pregnant for women in occupations with high WFH rates. In South Korea, [Kim \(2023\)](#) examines the relationship between working hours and pregnancy intentions and, although not focused on WFH, concludes that expanding WFH opportunities could raise fertility intentions. In contrast, [Kohara and Maity \(2021\)](#) report that pre-pandemic work-life balance policies enacted in Japan, such as childcare and parental care leave, do not influence fertility intentions. See [Choi et al. \(2024\)](#) for a fuller review of research in this area.

Our previous research finds that most people, and especially parents with young children,

highly value the opportunity to WFH part of the week. When asked directly, G-SWA respondents say the option to WFH two to three days a week is worth 5 percent of earnings, on average (Aksoy et al., 2022). The willingness to pay is slightly lower in Asian countries, but still sizable at around 3-5 percent of earnings. Regressing the willingness to pay for this option on individual and household characteristics, Aksoy et al. (2022) find particularly high valuations among people living with children under 14. Combined with the evidence presented in this paper and other studies, we conclude that WFH makes it easier to balance career and family, which may be why it has positive effects on fertility rates.

For societies faced with undesirably low birth rates, WFH can thus yield societal benefits that go beyond any direct benefits to employees and employers. In these circumstances, governments may consider policies that foster flexible working arrangements and to revisit policies that discourage such arrangements. An obvious place to start is the government's own workplace policies and practices for public sector employees. Because the government is a large employer in many occupations, changes to its workplace practices also influence practices in the private sector. Infrastructure to support reliable broadband service for households is another policy lever that influences the extent and effectiveness of remote work. Not surprisingly, a lack of access to reliable, high-speed internet services is a productivity killer when working remotely. See Barrero et al. (2021) for evidence.

An important force in some societies is the strong emphasis that parents attach to the education of their children, a responsibility that often falls mostly on women. This combination is sometimes seen as contributing to low fertility rates in East Asia (Myong et al., 2021). Kim et al. (2024) argue that a status externality, where parents care about their children's education relative to that of others, drives high educational investments in children – with high costs of child time, parental time, and household financial resources. According to this view, status-driven competition in child education is a key driver of extremely low fertility rates in East Asia. These status externalities could mute the potential impact of expanded WFH opportunities on desired and realized fertility. See Gobbi et al. (2026) for a broader discussion of how family-related institutions affect fertility rates and mediate fertility responses to exogenous shocks.

Two final points in closing this section: First, the desire to work remotely differs greatly across people, and its practicality differs greatly across jobs and organizations. Thus, policy interventions that push for a one-size-fits-all approach to working arrangements are likely to yield unhappier workers and lower productivity. Second, individual attitudes and social norms related to fertility, child rearing, work-life balance, and household responsibilities can be sticky and adjust slowly to the recent rise of WFH. Thus, the fertility consequences of WFH may have yet to peak.

6 Concluding Remarks

Individuals who work from home (WFH) at least one day a week have higher realized and expected fertility in the post-pandemic era. Fertility is higher yet if their partner also works from home at least one day a week. These patterns hold in our U.S. Survey of Working Arrangements and Attitudes and in our 38-country Global Survey of Working Arrangements.

Using G-SWA data, we estimate that lifetime fertility is greater by 0.32 children per woman when both partners WFH one or more days per week as compared to the case where neither does. Using SWAA data for the United States, we estimate that lifetime fertility is greater by 0.45 children per woman when both partners WFH. The implications for national fertility rates differ across countries due mainly to large differences in WFH rates.

Interpreted causally, our SWAA-based results imply that WFH accounts for 8.1% of U.S. fertility, or about 291,000 births per year as of 2024. While seemingly modest, this contribution appears to be greater than the fertility contribution of government spending on early childhood care and education in the United States.

Using Current Population Survey data for the United States, we find that one-year fertility rates rise with an individual's occupation-level WFH opportunities. Here as well, the partner's WFH opportunities exert a separate positive effect on fertility outcomes. This pattern holds after the pandemic (2023 to 2025) and before the pandemic (2017 to 2019) for both women and men.

Our findings support the idea that broader access to WFH in the aftermath of the pandemic raises fertility, perhaps by easing the time and coordination costs involved in combining paid work with family life. At the national level, the magnitude of the fertility consequences depend on the prevalence of WFH opportunities. Thus far at least, the post-pandemic shift to hybrid and fully remote work is highly uneven across countries. Bringing WFH rates to the levels that currently prevail in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada has the potential to materially boost fertility in many other countries.

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
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Figures and Tables


Figure 1: Share of Working Adults Who WFH At Least One Day Per Week




Notes: Responses to the question “For each day last week, did you work 6 or more hours, and if so where?”. *N* = 11,314 adults aged 20 to 45 years old in 38 countries surveyed in November 2024 - February 2025. Source: Global Survey of Working Arrangements.

Figure 2: The Distribution of lifetime fertility (Realized + Planned) across Households

Panel A: 38 Countries (G-SWA)




Panel B: United States (SWAA)



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
Notes: The figure reports the distribution of Total Planned Fertility, defined as the sum of the current total of biological children (including children in gestation) plus the desired number of additional children (for those who already have children) or the desired number of children (for those who do not yet have children). The sample consists of adults aged 20 to 45. $N = 11,314$ responses ($N = 5,432$ male, $N = 5,882$ female) for G-SWA, and $N = 89,917$ responses ($N = 45,118$ male, $N = 44,799$ female) for SWAA.

Figure 3: Lifetime fertility (Realized + Planned) by Household-Level Work from Home Status




Notes: The figure reports average Total Planned Fertility by WFH status. The sample is restricted to respondents aged 20 to 45 who report living with a partner. “No one WFH” means neither the respondent nor the partner works from home; “Only self WFH” means only the respondent works from home at least one day per week; and “Both WFH” means both partners work from home at least one day per week. G-SWA: $N = 2,929$ (1,227 male, 1,702 female) for No one WFH, $N = 1,345$ (577 male, 768 female) for Only self WFH, and $N = 1,336$ (757 male, 579 female) for Both WFH. SWAA: $N = 19,580$ (7,574 male, 12,006 female) for No one WFH, $N = 17,209$ (9,393 male, 7,816 female) for Only self WFH, and $N = 12,246$ (8,163 male, 4,083 female) for Both WFH.

Figure 4: Fertility Rises with Occupation-Level WFH Propensity, U.S. Data, 2023-2025



Notes: The figure shows a binscatter of an indicator for having a child under age 1 on the respondent’s occupation-level WFH propensity, which we measure as the mean 2023-25 value in the occupation-level statistics produced by Hansen et al. (2026). The sample covers CPS respondents ages 30–45 who were surveyed from 2023 to 2025. We use the last available observation for each respondent, as explained in Section 2.6, and restrict the sample to observations with positive CPS final weights. The horizontal variable is the natural log of occupation-level WFH propensity, with zeros replaced by 0.001 before logging. Points are weighted bin means computed using `binsreg` with 20 quantile-spaced bins, using identical bin cutpoints for men and women. Solid lines show linear regression fits. X-axis tick marks are placed at $\log(\cdot)$ of selected original WFH values.

Figure 5: Fertility Rises with Occupation-Level WFH Propensity, U.S. Data, 2017-2019



Notes: We construct this figure in the same manner as Figure 4 except for using data from 2017 to 2019. See the notes to Figure 4 for details.

Table 1: Persons Who Work from Home Have More Births Since 2023 in our 38-Country Sample (G-SWA)

	Women				Men			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Currently Working	-0.032*	-0.033*	-0.039*	-0.039*	0.063***	0.072***	0.043**	0.044**
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)
1(Paid Days WFH \geq 1)	0.050***	0.037**	0.032**	0.032**	0.043***	0.024**	0.022*	0.022**
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
1(Partner's Paid Days WFH \geq 1)			0.024	0.024			0.025	0.025
			(0.020)	(0.020)			(0.016)	(0.016)
Partner Works			0.032	0.031			-0.069***	-0.069***
			(0.024)	(0.024)			(0.020)	(0.020)
Has Spouse or Domestic Partner			0.083***	0.081***			0.176***	0.182***
			(0.023)	(0.023)			(0.021)	(0.022)
Had Children Before 2023				0.009				-0.013
				(0.013)				(0.014)
Observations	5882	5882	5882	5882	5432	5432	5432	5432
R^2	0.003	0.035	0.057	0.057	0.008	0.044	0.072	0.072
Mean	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.142	0.142	0.142	0.142
Standard Deviation	0.383	0.383	0.383	0.383	0.376	0.376	0.376	0.376
Controls		X	X	X		X	X	X

Notes: The dependent variable is the number of children born in 2023 or later, including children in gestation. Controls include 5-year age bins and education and country fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. The sample consists of adults aged 20 to 45, regardless of employment status or educational attainment.

Table 2: Americans Who Work from Home Have More Births Since 2023 (SWAA)

	Women				Men			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Currently Working	-0.123*** (0.018)	-0.124*** (0.017)	-0.111*** (0.016)	-0.108*** (0.015)	0.063*** (0.012)	0.047*** (0.012)	0.024* (0.012)	0.019 (0.012)
1(Paid Days WFH \geq 1)	0.099*** (0.010)	0.091*** (0.010)	0.085*** (0.010)	0.083*** (0.010)	0.099*** (0.016)	0.080*** (0.013)	0.074*** (0.012)	0.070*** (0.011)
1(Partner's Paid Days WFH \geq 1)			-0.014 (0.014)	-0.015 (0.014)			0.063*** (0.012)	0.058*** (0.013)
Partner Works			0.061** (0.024)	0.060** (0.024)			0.014 (0.018)	0.019 (0.018)
Has Spouse or Domestic Partner			0.120*** (0.022)	0.114*** (0.022)			0.085*** (0.018)	0.068*** (0.019)
Had Children Before 2023				0.028** (0.013)				0.055*** (0.011)
Observations	14834	14834	14834	14834	15941	15941	15941	15941
R^2	0.009	0.044	0.066	0.066	0.013	0.054	0.069	0.071
Mean	0.275	0.275	0.275	0.275	0.221	0.221	0.221	0.221
Standard Deviation	0.546	0.546	0.546	0.546	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500
Controls		X	X	X		X	X	X

Notes: The dependent variable is the number of children born in 2023 or later, including children in gestation. Controls include 5-year age bins and education, month, and state fixed effects. Errors clustered at the state level. The sample consists of adults aged 20 to 45, regardless of employment status or educational attainment, surveyed in 2025.

Table 3: Plans for Future Fertility Rise with Own and Partner's Work from Home Status in our 38-Country Sample (G-SWA)

	Women				Men			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Currently Working	0.060 (0.051)	0.120*** (0.043)	0.117*** (0.043)	0.120*** (0.041)	0.034 (0.077)	0.150** (0.064)	0.161** (0.066)	0.182*** (0.066)
1(Paid Days WFH \geq 1)	0.153*** (0.043)	0.086** (0.034)	0.070* (0.035)	0.080** (0.036)	0.161** (0.066)	0.061 (0.044)	0.041 (0.046)	0.057 (0.046)
1(Partner's Paid Days WFH \geq 1)			0.111** (0.050)	0.107** (0.049)			0.115 (0.069)	0.129* (0.070)
Partner Works			0.031 (0.105)	0.054 (0.105)			0.071 (0.071)	0.063 (0.070)
Has Spouse or Domestic Partner			0.008 (0.091)	0.064 (0.092)			-0.141* (0.077)	-0.013 (0.076)
Had Children Before 2023				-0.243*** (0.046)				-0.295*** (0.049)
Observations	5882	5882	5882	5882	5432	5432	5432	5432
R^2	0.004	0.152	0.154	0.160	0.003	0.116	0.117	0.124
Mean	0.860	0.860	0.860	0.860	1.057	1.057	1.057	1.057
Standard Deviation	1.303	1.303	1.303	1.303	1.460	1.460	1.460	1.460
Controls		X	X	X		X	X	X

Notes: The dependent variable is the number of desired children (for those who did not have children yet) or the number of desired additional children (for those who had children). Controls include 5-year age bins and education and country fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. The sample consists of adults aged 20 to 45, regardless of employment status or educational attainment.

Table 4: Plans for Future Fertility Rise with Own and Partner's Work from Home Status in the United States (SWAA)

	Women				Men			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Currently Working	0.067*** (0.024)	0.097*** (0.027)	0.099*** (0.027)	0.082*** (0.028)	0.148** (0.062)	0.141** (0.062)	0.148** (0.058)	0.162*** (0.057)
1(Paid Days WFH \geq 1)	0.110*** (0.019)	0.086*** (0.016)	0.079*** (0.016)	0.095*** (0.017)	0.116*** (0.024)	0.063*** (0.023)	0.039* (0.023)	0.052** (0.023)
1(Partner's Paid Days WFH \geq 1)			0.064** (0.026)	0.065** (0.026)			0.152*** (0.040)	0.158*** (0.040)
Partner Works			-0.032 (0.040)	-0.028 (0.042)			0.122*** (0.035)	0.115*** (0.035)
Has Spouse or Domestic Partner			0.026 (0.045)	0.067 (0.045)			-0.172*** (0.032)	-0.125*** (0.035)
Had Children Before 2023				-0.199*** (0.023)				-0.164*** (0.025)
Observations	43314	43314	43314	43085	43720	43720	43720	43662
R^2	0.002	0.100	0.100	0.104	0.002	0.045	0.047	0.048
Mean	0.885	0.885	0.885	0.886	1.085	1.085	1.085	1.085
Standard Deviation	1.493	1.493	1.493	1.494	1.762	1.762	1.762	1.762
Controls		X	X	X		X	X	X

Notes: The dependent variable is the number of desired children (for those who did not have children yet) or the number of desired additional children (for those who had children). Controls include 5-year age bins and education, month, and state fixed effects. Errors clustered at the state level. The sample consists of adults aged 20 to 45, regardless of employment status or educational attainment.

Table 5: How lifetime fertility (Realized + Planned) Relates to Work from Home Status in our 38-Country Sample (G-SWA)

	Women				Men			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Currently Working	0.008 (0.068)	0.041 (0.067)	0.009 (0.061)	-0.007 (0.057)	0.445*** (0.103)	0.455*** (0.083)	0.267*** (0.086)	0.177** (0.072)
1(Paid Days WFH \geq 1)	0.362*** (0.066)	0.249*** (0.063)	0.224*** (0.058)	0.164*** (0.044)	0.376*** (0.097)	0.230*** (0.061)	0.197*** (0.058)	0.131** (0.056)
1(Partner's Paid Days WFH \geq 1)			0.100 (0.062)	0.124* (0.066)			0.197** (0.086)	0.134 (0.082)
Partner Works			0.152 (0.121)	0.015 (0.108)			-0.043 (0.087)	-0.006 (0.088)
Has Spouse or Domestic Partner			0.577*** (0.111)	0.241** (0.093)			0.776*** (0.092)	0.231** (0.107)
Had Children Before 2023				1.451*** (0.076)				1.255*** (0.068)
Observations	5882	5882	5882	5882	5432	5432	5432	5432
R^2	0.010	0.094	0.135	0.262	0.020	0.099	0.139	0.215
Mean	1.966	1.966	1.966	1.966	2.048	2.048	2.048	2.048
Standard Deviation	1.729	1.729	1.729	1.729	1.885	1.885	1.885	1.885
Controls		X	X	X		X	X	X

Notes: The dependent variable is the sum of the current total of biological children (including children in gestation) plus the desired additional children (for those who had children) or the number of desired children (for those who did not have children yet). Controls include 5-year age bins and education and country fixed effects. Errors clustered at the country level. The sample consists of adults aged 20 to 45, regardless of employment status or educational attainment.

Table 6: How lifetime fertility (Realized + Planned) Relates to Work from Home Status in the United States (SWAA)

	Women				Men			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Currently Working	-0.303*** (0.052)	-0.270*** (0.049)	-0.230*** (0.045)	-0.109*** (0.034)	0.532*** (0.054)	0.441*** (0.063)	0.318*** (0.056)	0.157** (0.059)
1(Paid Days WFH \geq 1)	0.415*** (0.023)	0.404*** (0.021)	0.380*** (0.021)	0.226*** (0.021)	0.510*** (0.055)	0.312*** (0.034)	0.286*** (0.032)	0.141*** (0.030)
1(Partner's Paid Days WFH \geq 1)			0.073* (0.038)	0.068** (0.030)			0.261*** (0.051)	0.195*** (0.046)
Partner Works			0.022 (0.073)	-0.045 (0.057)			-0.031 (0.059)	0.039 (0.052)
Has Spouse or Domestic Partner			0.568*** (0.063)	0.196*** (0.054)			0.557*** (0.066)	0.065 (0.060)
Had Children Before 2023				1.726*** (0.025)				1.634*** (0.041)
Observations	43314	43314	43314	43085	43720	43720	43720	43662
R^2	0.008	0.021	0.040	0.171	0.020	0.050	0.066	0.150
Mean	2.356	2.356	2.356	2.362	2.367	2.367	2.367	2.368
Standard Deviation	2.064	2.064	2.064	2.061	2.380	2.380	2.380	2.378
Controls		X	X	X		X	X	X

Notes: The dependent variable is the sum of the current total of biological children (including children in gestation) plus the desired additional children (for those who had children) or the number of desired children (for those who did not have children yet). Controls include 5-year age bins and education, month, and state fixed effects. Errors clustered at the state level. The sample consists of adults aged 20 to 45, regardless of employment status or educational attainment.

Table 7: Lifetime fertility Differences by Household-Level Work from Home Status

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Global (GSWA)			US (SWAA)		
	Women	Men	Average	Women	Men	Average
(1) Sample Mean						
<i>Value</i>	2.260	2.431	2.345	2.588	2.719	2.653
(2) Only Self WFH						
<i>Difference</i>	0.224	0.197	0.211	0.380	0.286	0.333
(3) Only Partner WFH						
<i>Difference</i>	0.100	0.197	0.148	0.073	0.261	0.167
(4) Both WFH						
<i>Difference</i>	0.324	0.394	0.359	0.453	0.547	0.500
<i>As % of Mean</i>	14.3	16.2	15.3	17.5	20.1	18.8

Notes: Panel (1) reports sample mean values of lifetime fertility, defined as the respondent’s number of biological children as of the survey date (including children in gestation) plus his or her planned number of future children, restricted to partnered respondents. Panel (2) reports the regression-predicted lifetime fertility difference between partnered respondents who WFH 1+ days a week and partnered respondents who do not WFH, conditional on all other variables in the regression model, based on columns (3) and (7) in Tables 5 and 6. Similarly, Panel (3) reports the regression-predicted lifetime fertility difference associated with the partner’s WFH status, conditional on all other variables. Panel (4) reports the sum of these two effects. Columns headed by “Average” report the simple mean of the corresponding values for “Women” and “Men.”

Table 8: How One-Year Fertility Responds to Own and Partner’s Occupation-Level WFH Opportunities, 2023–2025 (CPS)

	Women				Men			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Log specification								
Log WFH Propensity/100	0.366*** (0.084)	0.201*** (0.072)	0.320*** (0.122)	0.292** (0.115)	0.470*** (0.081)	0.180** (0.075)	0.444*** (0.130)	0.385*** (0.129)
Partner’s Log WFH Propensity/100			0.425*** (0.090)	0.335*** (0.091)			0.246** (0.100)	0.191* (0.101)
R^2	0.0007	0.0318	0.0013	0.0337	0.0011	0.0328	0.0011	0.0235
Mean of log(WFH)/100	-0.0312	-0.0312	-0.0302	-0.0302	-0.0328	-0.0328	-0.0312	-0.0312
SD of log(WFH)/100	0.0135	0.0135	0.0133	0.0133	0.0141	0.0141	0.0139	0.0139
Panel B: Linear specification								
WFH Propensity	0.048*** (0.014)	0.028** (0.012)	0.044** (0.019)	0.039** (0.018)	0.058*** (0.012)	0.024** (0.012)	0.049*** (0.019)	0.040** (0.019)
Partner’s WFH Propensity			0.049*** (0.012)	0.036*** (0.012)			0.037*** (0.013)	0.030** (0.013)
R^2	0.0007	0.0318	0.0012	0.0336	0.0009	0.0328	0.0010	0.0234
Mean of WFH Propensity	0.0941	0.0941	0.1003	0.1003	0.0894	0.0894	0.0985	0.0985
SD of WFH Propensity	0.1026	0.1026	0.1044	0.1044	0.1058	0.1058	0.1079	0.1079
Observations	66,642	66,642	40,540	40,540	70,435	70,435	38,142	38,142
Fertility Outcome Mean	0.0373	0.0373	0.0531	0.0531	0.0414	0.0414	0.0593	0.0593
Fertility Outcome Standard Deviation	0.1895	0.1895	0.2242	0.2242	0.1993	0.1993	0.2361	0.2361
Controls		X		X		X		X

Notes: The sample covers CPS respondents, 30–45 years of age from 2023 to 2025, with usable occupation information. The dependent variable is an indicator for the respondent has a child under age 1. Columns (1)–(2) and (5)–(6) use the full sample; columns (3)–(4) and (7)–(8) restrict to respondents with partners and usable data on the partner’s occupation. WFH propensity is the 2023-25 mean value of the occupation-level share of job postings that offer 1+ WFH days per week in Hansen et al. (2026). “Controls” include fixed effects for calendar year, one-year age bins, and marital status. We weight using CPS final weights and cluster errors by respondent occupation. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 9: How One-Year Fertility Responds to Own and Partner's Occupation-Level WFH Opportunities, 2017–2019 (CPS)

	Women				Men			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Log specification								
Log WFH Propensity/100	0.424*** (0.094)	0.315*** (0.078)	0.533*** (0.130)	0.500*** (0.125)	0.506*** (0.075)	0.254*** (0.071)	0.433*** (0.109)	0.425*** (0.104)
Partner's Log WFH Propensity/100			0.442*** (0.101)	0.436*** (0.102)			0.333*** (0.125)	0.324*** (0.122)
R^2	0.0009	0.0274	0.0022	0.0302	0.0011	0.0315	0.0011	0.0231
Mean of log(WFH)/100	-0.0432	-0.0432	-0.0424	-0.0424	-0.0452	-0.0452	-0.0438	-0.0438
SD of log(WFH)/100	0.0133	0.0133	0.0131	0.0131	0.0136	0.0136	0.0134	0.0134
Panel B: Linear specification								
WFH Propensity	0.118*** (0.035)	0.095*** (0.032)	0.141** (0.057)	0.135** (0.056)	0.165*** (0.028)	0.093*** (0.025)	0.157*** (0.038)	0.146*** (0.037)
Partner's WFH Propensity			0.164*** (0.041)	0.155*** (0.041)			0.106** (0.050)	0.107** (0.048)
R^2	0.0006	0.0273	0.0015	0.0296	0.0008	0.0315	0.0010	0.0228
Mean of WFH Propensity	0.0290	0.0290	0.0300	0.0300	0.0256	0.0256	0.0280	0.0280
SD of WFH Propensity	0.0381	0.0381	0.0381	0.0381	0.0349	0.0349	0.0353	0.0353
Observations	61,633	61,633	34,618	34,618	65,551	65,551	33,109	33,109
Fertility Outcome Mean	0.0375	0.0375	0.0514	0.0514	0.0440	0.0440	0.0610	0.0610
Fertility Outcome Standard Deviation	0.1899	0.1899	0.2209	0.2209	0.2050	0.2050	0.2394	0.2394
Controls		X		X		X		X

Notes: We construct this table in the same manner as Table 8 except for using data from 2017 to 2019. See the notes to Table 8 for details.

Table 10: Realized and counterfactual contributions of WFH to national fertility

Country	TFR (1)	WFH Share, Women (2)	LFPR, Women (3)	WFH's TFR Contribution		Extra TFR If WFH Share = 0.453	
				In TFR Units (4)	As % of TFR (5)	In TFR Units (6)	As % of TFR (7)
USA	1.62	0.417	78.0	0.131	8.1	—	—
Canada	1.33	0.475	85.2	0.101	7.6	—	—
UK	1.54	0.466	83.1	0.096	6.2	—	—
Germany	1.46	0.322	83.1	0.067	4.6	0.027	1.8
South Korea	0.75	0.267	72.1	0.048	6.4	0.033	4.4
Japan	1.23	0.181	84.7	0.038	3.1	0.057	4.6
Italy	1.21	0.210	70.2	0.037	3.1	0.042	3.5
France	1.64	0.256	84.9	0.054	3.3	0.042	2.6

Notes: Column (1) reports the total fertility rate (TFR) as of 2024 in [United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division \(2025\)](#). Column (2) reports the share of women, ages 20–45, who work from home at least one day per week in our SWAA data for the United States and our G-SWA data for the other countries. These statistics pertain to the 2023-25 period for the United States and the 2024-25 period for the other countries. Column (3) reports labor force participation rate of women, ages 25-54, from [International Labour Organization \(2025\)](#)). See Section (5.1) and equation (3) for an explanation of how we calculate the entries in columns (4) and (5). See Section (5.3) and equation (4) for an explanation of how we calculate the entries in columns (6) and (7).

Appendix

Table A.1: Response and Field Times in G-SWA Wave 4 (Fertility Analysis Sample)

Country	Mean	5%	Median	95%	N	Start date	End date
Argentina	12.28	5.01	8.81	24.32	388	Nov. 12, 2024	Feb. 3, 2025
Australia	8.86	3.44	6.16	22.00	420	Nov. 12, 2024	Feb. 4, 2025
Austria	14.16	4.14	6.95	22.44	374	Nov. 8, 2024	Feb. 3, 2025
Brazil	13.78	5.07	9.24	28.85	374	Nov. 12, 2024	Feb. 3, 2025
Canada	12.36	3.38	6.40	44.14	374	Nov. 12, 2024	Feb. 3, 2025
Chile	13.75	5.04	8.46	29.46	350	Nov. 12, 2024	Feb. 3, 2025
China	19.11	4.18	9.96	41.26	500	Nov. 13, 2024	Feb. 3, 2025
Czech Rep.	9.94	3.99	6.75	24.24	420	Nov. 8, 2024	Feb. 3, 2025
Denmark	9.06	4.46	6.84	18.73	382	Nov. 8, 2024	Feb. 3, 2025
Egypt	12.85	4.85	9.49	22.98	506	Nov. 13, 2024	Feb. 3, 2025
Finland	8.76	4.04	6.33	15.38	417	Nov. 8, 2024	Feb. 3, 2025
France	12.95	4.00	6.85	22.64	868	Nov. 7, 2024	Feb. 3, 2025
Germany	11.60	3.98	6.65	24.81	1,038	Oct. 29, 2024	Feb. 3, 2025
Greece	9.75	4.07	6.48	23.88	386	Nov. 8, 2024	Feb. 4, 2025
Hungary	12.68	4.12	7.09	28.04	464	Nov. 13, 2024	Feb. 3, 2025
Ireland	11.77	3.62	6.12	17.29	361	Nov. 13, 2024	Feb. 4, 2025
Italy	9.73	3.49	6.19	20.37	1,121	Nov. 7, 2024	Feb. 3, 2025
Japan	7.56	3.11	5.77	16.92	489	Nov. 12, 2024	Feb. 4, 2025
Malaysia	14.91	4.81	8.83	26.15	507	Nov. 12, 2024	Feb. 4, 2025
Mexico	11.77	5.15	8.73	23.07	394	Nov. 12, 2024	Feb. 3, 2025
Netherlands	10.03	3.71	6.15	21.97	423	Nov. 8, 2024	Feb. 3, 2025
New Zealand	11.03	4.00	6.85	27.78	479	Nov. 12, 2024	Feb. 5, 2025
Norway	10.12	4.06	6.59	22.76	405	Nov. 8, 2024	Feb. 3, 2025
Poland	12.11	3.92	6.65	29.26	449	Nov. 13, 2024	Feb. 3, 2025
Portugal	10.69	4.61	7.45	22.13	400	Nov. 13, 2024	Feb. 4, 2025
Romania	10.22	4.32	6.95	23.69	432	Nov. 13, 2024	Feb. 3, 2025
Singapore	14.62	3.59	6.58	26.03	484	Nov. 14, 2024	Feb. 4, 2025
South Africa	14.50	5.94	10.41	29.93	411	Nov. 11, 2024	Feb. 3, 2025
South Korea	8.00	3.31	5.93	17.18	452	Nov. 12, 2024	Feb. 4, 2025
Spain	11.99	3.71	6.24	20.55	390	Nov. 8, 2024	Feb. 5, 2025
Sweden	10.71	4.01	6.33	19.38	393	Nov. 8, 2024	Feb. 4, 2025
Taiwan	9.61	3.71	6.67	19.52	502	Nov. 14, 2024	Feb. 4, 2025
Thailand	9.46	4.13	7.78	18.97	482	Nov. 12, 2024	Feb. 3, 2025
The Philippines	12.25	5.34	9.83	25.91	460	Nov. 8, 2024	Feb. 5, 2025
Türkiye	8.31	3.96	6.89	16.67	449	Nov. 13, 2024	Feb. 3, 2025
UK	12.51	3.64	6.94	30.14	1,013	Nov. 7, 2024	Feb. 3, 2025
USA	9.88	3.28	6.01	20.28	1,037	Oct. 28, 2024	Feb. 5, 2025
Vietnam	12.22	4.15	7.56	24.92	447	Nov. 12, 2024	Feb. 3, 2025
Full sample	11.44	3.83	7.06	24.22	19,241	–	–

Source: G-SWA Wave 4 on adults aged 20 to 64 years old, after removing “speeders” and respondents who fail attention check questions.

Table A.2: Comparisons of G-SWA Data with Gallup World Poll Data and OECD Data

Country	Share of women		Aged 20 to 33		Aged 34 to 46		Aged 47 to 64		Elementary education, percent		Secondary education, percent		Tertiary or more, percent	
	G-SWA	Gallup	G-SWA	Gallup	G-SWA	Gallup	G-SWA	Gallup	G-SWA	OECD	G-SWA	OECD	G-SWA	OECD
Argentina	49.74	50.00	42.53	41.69	27.58	28.35	29.90	29.96	3.87	21.65	50.77	42.69	45.36	35.66
Australia	53.10	50.00	32.14	30.85	32.38	29.29	35.48	39.85	1.19	3.38	45.24	47.05	53.57	49.34
Austria	47.48	50.00	32.63	29.87	30.77	30.20	36.60	39.94	0.53	0.96	62.60	64.83	36.87	34.21
Brazil	51.20	50.00	37.33	37.09	30.93	32.56	31.73	30.35	5.60	29.96	60.27	49.90	34.13	20.14
Canada	46.26	50.00	32.09	31.30	30.21	28.64	37.70	40.06	2.14	1.93	34.76	38.10	63.10	59.96
Chile	49.71	50.00	36.57	37.04	28.86	28.75	34.57	34.21	1.71	11.91	71.14	62.92	27.14	25.17
China	49.70	50.00	35.73	38.41	31.54	30.89	32.73	30.69	0.60	28.19	90.42	62.13	8.98	9.68
Czech Rep.	50.00	50.00	24.52	25.53	35.24	34.10	40.24	40.37	5.00	7.94	74.52	72.71	20.48	19.07
Denmark	48.56	50.00	28.46	32.52	30.81	26.13	40.73	41.34	5.22	2.21	43.34	57.43	51.44	40.35
Egypt	50.99	50.00	48.22	43.41	31.62	31.68	20.16	24.92	2.37	48.99	37.55	32.28	60.08	18.67
Finland	48.80	50.00	31.34	29.79	27.75	28.86	40.91	41.36	1.44	0.96	47.37	51.16	51.20	47.87
France	50.23	50.00	35.78	34.13	27.29	26.03	36.93	39.84	0.23	5.63	58.26	54.66	41.51	39.72
Germany	48.37	50.00	28.21	28.41	26.20	27.04	45.59	44.55	3.74	4.28	64.97	64.47	31.29	31.26
Greece	51.16	50.00	29.20	28.53	31.78	31.49	39.02	39.98	0.52	11.58	66.15	55.68	33.33	32.74
Hungary	50.75	50.00	28.39	28.25	37.42	37.95	34.19	33.80	1.72	1.05	71.61	71.75	26.67	27.20
Ireland	48.48	50.00	34.71	33.50	31.68	30.92	33.61	35.58	1.10	4.65	45.73	45.40	53.17	49.94
Italy	50.36	50.00	23.89	24.78	33.42	32.57	42.69	42.65	1.07	4.99	83.42	74.87	15.51	20.14
Japan	48.47	50.00	23.83	27.23	31.57	30.60	44.60	42.17	0.00	5.39	72.30	66.34	27.70	27.22
Malaysia	50.89	50.00	45.56	46.02	31.16	29.90	23.27	24.08	0.59	16.31	80.28	64.62	19.13	18.32
Mexico	47.46	50.00	40.10	41.19	29.19	29.52	30.71	29.29	1.52	25.65	58.12	54.92	40.36	19.43
Netherlands	52.36	50.00	29.48	30.61	27.59	26.47	42.92	42.91	3.54	5.48	52.36	51.87	44.10	42.64
New Zealand	53.86	50.00	25.68	31.42	34.24	28.74	40.08	39.84	0.21	6.64	53.24	61.05	46.56	31.89
Norway	49.88	50.00	30.62	30.72	31.85	29.39	37.53	39.89	2.22	0.75	51.36	53.97	46.42	45.27
Poland	50.11	50.00	29.93	30.92	32.15	32.97	37.92	36.11	2.44	5.81	65.41	61.32	32.15	32.88
Portugal	50.37	50.00	29.68	27.71	30.67	30.46	39.65	41.84	1.25	24.76	68.83	47.07	29.93	28.11
Romania	51.62	50.00	26.85	28.18	32.41	32.79	40.74	39.03	2.08	15.63	81.94	66.86	15.97	16.31
Singapore	50.41	50.00	30.79	31.87	30.79	29.81	38.43	38.31	1.86	12.60	61.57	51.07	36.57	35.72
South Africa	50.12	50.00	47.20	46.16	31.14	31.86	21.65	21.97	1.46	13.80	73.72	70.36	24.82	15.84
South Korea	49.34	50.00	23.45	27.15	30.09	29.43	46.46	43.42	1.11	11.79	58.85	50.41	40.04	37.61
Spain	48.34	50.00	35.81	35.15	31.46	31.53	32.74	33.32	2.05	8.05	59.34	52.26	38.62	39.69
Sweden	47.07	50.00	31.81	30.49	26.72	28.91	41.48	40.61	2.80	2.59	57.25	52.80	39.95	44.61
Taiwan	50.89	50.00	26.64	27.74	31.21	31.26	42.15	41.01	0.80	13.02	59.44	47.40	39.76	39.30
Thailand	50.10	50.00	28.36	29.94	39.13	37.21	32.51	32.84	6.21	39.76	74.53	38.86	19.25	17.57
The Philippines	51.95	50.00	44.37	47.56	33.55	31.89	22.08	20.55	3.90	28.20	72.94	50.72	23.16	21.01
Türkiye	47.22	50.00	40.53	38.92	33.18	30.93	26.28	30.15	2.00	43.11	72.61	34.93	25.39	21.95
UK	47.49	50.00	34.71	32.12	26.55	28.33	38.74	39.55	0.10	0.16	47.39	50.43	52.51	49.39
USA	49.71	50.00	31.79	34.06	28.81	27.44	39.40	38.51	3.47	3.01	45.18	46.94	51.35	50.06
Vietnam	50.11	50.00	40.49	40.71	32.21	33.50	27.29	25.79	8.28	10.98	65.32	61.28	26.40	25.13

Source: G-SWA Wave 4 on adults aged 20 to 64 years old, after removing “speeders” and respondents who fail attention check questions. Gallup World Polls, and OECD Education Data (OECD, 2022).

Table A.3: Summary Statistics – G-SWA (Wave 4, Fertility Analysis Sample)

	All respondents			By paid days worked			Full-time only		
	(1) Overall	(2) Men	(3) Women	(4) Not working	(5) Part time	(6) Full time	(7) Fully onsite	(8) Hybrid	(9) Fully remote
<i>N</i>	19241	9647	9594	4094	2381	12766	7158	3553	2055
Share of sample (%)	100	50.14	49.86	21.28	12.37	66.35	56.07	27.83	16.1
<i>Percentages</i>									
Female	49.86	0	100	61.55	54.89	45.17	42.83	43.29	56.59
Aged 20-33	32.68	29.71	35.67	27.5	37.3	33.48	29.39	41.46	33.92
Aged 34-46	30.81	31.66	29.97	22.2	28.73	33.97	34.74	34.03	31.14
Aged 47-64	36.51	38.63	34.37	50.29	33.98	32.56	35.86	24.51	34.94
College Educated	36.05	37.01	35.08	22.2	36.04	40.49	34.67	56.37	33.28
Production Industries	18.78	24.69	12.84	12.99	15.54	21.24	24.42	19.67	12.9
Service Industries	81.22	75.31	87.16	87.01	84.46	78.76	75.58	80.33	87.1
Has Partner	58.84	58.41	59.28	50.37	54.89	62.3	62.24	68.25	52.21
WFH at least 1 day/week	34.35	35.3	33.4	0	42.04	43.93	0	100	100
WFH status: Fully Onsite (0 days)	44.37	48.39	40.34	0	57.96	56.07	100	0	0
WFH Status: Hybrid (1-4 days)	23.67	26.05	21.27	0	42.04	27.83	0	100	0
WFH Status: Fully Remote (5+ days)	10.68	9.246	12.12	0	0	16.1	0	0	100
<i>Averages</i>									
Paid days worked (last week)	4.131	4.432	3.829	0	3.066	5.655	5.463	5.748	6.164
Paid days WFH (last week)	1.029	.9972	1.062	0	.916	1.381	0	2.068	5
Paid days WFH - Production industries	.8351	.7762	.9489	0	.9459	.9838	0	1.921	5
Paid days WFH - Service industries	1.074	1.07	1.078	0	.9105	1.488	0	2.104	5
Children born since 2023	.09454	.09143	.09767	.06448	.09744	.1036	.08424	.1492	.09246
Planned Fertility (additional children)	.6124	.6758	.5488	.4209	.6426	.6683	.5781	.8705	.6326
Total Planned Fertility	1.788	1.775	1.801	1.603	1.751	1.854	1.725	2.144	1.804

Notes: The table reports percentages or means for the variables listed in each row. The sample consists of adults aged 20–64, regardless of employment status or educational attainment. “Not working” corresponds to 0 paid days in the survey reference week, “part time” to 1–4 paid days, and “full time” to 5 or more paid days per week. “Fully onsite” corresponds to 0 WFH days in the reference week, “hybrid” to 1–4 WFH days, and “fully remote” to 5 or more WFH days. The last three rows report (i) the number of children born since 2021, (ii) the number of desired additional children, and (iii) the sum of current children and desired additional children.

Source: G-SWA Wave 4.

Table A.4: Descriptives on Mean Age at First Marriage, Partner Age Gap, and Teen Births

Country	Difference in mean age at first marriage (Male–Female) (year)	Partner age gap (years)	Percent of all births to women under age 20 (2023)
Argentina	2.0 (2010)	N/A	9.2
Australia	1.2 (2016)	N/A	1.7
Austria	2.7 (2011)	3.0	1.1
Brazil	2.9 (2010)	3.6	12.7
Canada	1.6 (2016)	2.6	1.4
Chile	1.9 (2011)	N/A	2.2
China	1.7 (2016)	2.2	2.2
Czech Republic	2.4 (2018)	2.0	1.8
Denmark	1.7 (2018)	2.8	0.3
Egypt	5.8 (2017)	6.4	8.9
Finland	1.9 (2018)	2.2	1.1
France	1.7 (2013)	2.3	1.1
Germany	2.2 (2018)	2.6	1.4
Greece	3.6 (2011)	4.3	2.6
Hungary	2.1 (2018)	3.0	5.0
Ireland	1.0 (2016)	2.2	1.3
Italy	3.1 (2018)	N/A	1.0
Japan	1.3 (2015)	2.5	0.6
Malaysia	2.3 (2010)	N/A	1.9
Mexico	2.7 (2019)	3.2	16.5
Netherlands	1.9 (2018)	2.3	0.6
New Zealand	1.5 (2006)	N/A	2.9
Norway	2.0 (2018)	2.8	0.4
Philippines	3.1 (2017)	2.8	9.7
Poland	2.1 (2011)	2.6	1.9
Portugal	2.1 (2011)	2.5	2.1
Romania	3.2 (2011)	3.5	10.2
Singapore	2.5 (2010)	N/A	0.8
South Africa	3.5 (2016)	3.8	11.5
South Korea	3.5 (2008)	N/A	0.3
Spain	2.6 (2011)	2.5	1.8
Sweden	2.2 (2018)	2.5	0.5
Taiwan	2.9 (2000)	3.3	1.1
Thailand	3.6 (2010)	3.0	9.6
Türkiye	0.4 (2013)	3.8	3.5
UK	1.7 (2011)	2.4	2.4
USA	1.7 (2010)	2.2	4.0
Vietnam	4.1 (2015)	2.9	8.8

Notes: Column (2) reports the male–female difference in mean age at first marriage among persons who ever marry before age 50; the year in parentheses is the most recent observation year. Column (3) reports the average partner age gap (husband minus wife) among different-sex couples. Column (4) reports the percent of births to women aged 10–19 (a proxy for teen births). N/A indicates unavailable data. *Sources:* United Nations World Marriage Data (2019); Ausubel et al. (2022), Population Studies; United Nations World Population Prospects (2023), as presented via [Our World in Data](#).

Table A.5: Summary Statistics – SWAA

	All respondents			By paid days worked			Full-time only		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Overall	Men	Women	Not working	Part time	Full time	Fully onsite	Hybrid	Fully remote
<i>N</i>	135949	66492	69457	18012	23375	94562	42669	33526	18367
Share of sample (%)	100	48.91	51.09	13.25	17.19	69.56	45.12	35.45	19.42
<i>Percentages</i>									
Female	49.31	0	100	62.23	52.59	45.17	43.69	40.74	55.6
Aged 20-33	29.66	29.2	30.13	24.4	36.28	29.3	26.58	34.35	28.51
Aged 34-46	32.08	33.48	30.64	22.49	30.53	34.88	31.54	41.8	32.83
Aged 47-64	38.26	37.31	39.23	53.11	33.19	35.82	41.88	23.86	38.66
College Educated	39.35	36.13	42.66	26.58	37.25	43.16	31.72	61.32	44.64
Production Industries	19.49	28.7	10.03	14.99	17.35	21.19	24.45	21.37	12.68
Service Industries	80.51	71.3	89.97	85.01	82.65	78.81	75.55	78.63	87.32
Has Partner	61.46	60.96	61.98	56.62	58.65	63.42	61.64	68.78	59.83
WFH at least 1 day/week	40.85	42.52	39.13	0	46.7	49.83	0	100	100
WFH status: Fully Onsite (0 days)	59.15	57.48	60.87	100	53.3	50.17	100	0	0
WFH Status: Hybrid (1-4 days)	27.72	31.02	24.33	0	46.7	30	0	100	0
WFH Status: Fully Remote (5+ days)	13.13	11.5	14.8	0	0	19.84	0	0	100
<i>Averages</i>									
Paid days worked (last week)	4.299	4.615	3.974	0	3.316	5.651	5.474	5.766	5.925
Paid days WFH (last week)	1.298	1.28	1.317	0	1.125	1.675	0	2.278	5
Paid days WFH - Production industries	1.071	1.006	1.261	0	1.066	1.266	0	2.223	5
Paid days WFH - Service industries	1.353	1.39	1.323	0	1.137	1.785	0	2.293	5
Children born since 2023	.1175	.1274	.1074	.08049	.1288	.1242	.08336	.194	.1218
Planned Fertility (additional children)	.6192	.706	.53	.4064	.708	.6511	.5427	.8457	.6313
Total Planned Fertility	2.166	2.135	2.197	2.028	2.177	2.198	2.015	2.537	2.151

Notes: The table reports the percentage or average of the variables listed in each row, among respondents in the sample in the column. The sample consists of adults aged 20–64. “Not working” corresponds to respondents working 0 paid days in the survey reference week, “Part time” to 1–4 days, and “Full time” to 5 or more days per week. “Fully onsite” corresponds to 0 days WFH in the survey reference week, “Hybrid” to 1–4 days WFH, and “Fully remote” to 5 or more days WFH per week. “Paid days WFH” counts days worked from home (among days worked for pay). “Ind. paid days WFH” rows report average paid days WFH within production and service industries. The last three rows report the number of children born since 2021, the number of desired additional children, and the sum of current children and desired additional children. *Source:* SWAA.

Table A.6: CPS Samples with Hansen et al. Measure of Occupational WFH Intensity

Sample restriction	Observations
Overall CPS observations (2023–2025)	745,542
Restrict to ages 30–45	156,900
Restrict to respondents with non-missing occupation	138,633
Restrict to matched Hansen occupation*	137,160
Restrict to non-missing spouse occupation	79,606
Restrict to spouse matched Hansen occupation	78,735
Restrict to Positive CPS Weights ($w_{\text{finl}} > 0$)	78,682
Final sample: Women	40,540
Final sample: Men	38,142

* If a CPS occupation does not match the Hansen data at the 6-digit occupation level, we match at the 5-digit level. The 5-digit WFH intensity is calculated as the mean across all 6-digit Hansen occupation WFH intensities within that 5-digit group. In the 2023–2025, ages 30–45 CPS sample, we start from 4-digit CPS occupation codes (OCC) and use the CPS→SOC crosswalk(s) to translate them into 6-digit SOC/OCCSOC codes so they can be merged to the Hansen WFH data, which is indexed by SOC-style occupation codes rather than CPS OCC. Because the crosswalk is not strictly one-to-one—and because some CPS OCC codes have no listed SOC mapping in the crosswalk for this period—the set of 526 unique 4-digit OCC codes becomes 521 unique 6-digit OCCSOC codes: one 4-digit occupation (9840) never receives a 6-digit SOC code, and four pairs of distinct 4-digit OCC codes collapse onto the same SOC code (1520/1530 → 1721XX; 1935/1970 → 1940XX; 5350/5420 → 434XXX; 6800/6950 → 4750XX). After constructing 6-digit OCCSOC codes, 420 of 521 (80.6%) occupations match Hansen directly at the 6-digit level, leaving 101 occupations unmatched; using the 5-digit prefix fallback recovers 94 additional occupations, bringing total matched to 514 (98.7%). In terms of people-rows, there are 138,633 observations with a non-missing post-crosswalk OCCSOC code; 107,993 (77.9%) match Hansen at 6 digits, and with the 5-digit fallback the matched count rises to 137,160 (98.9%).

Table A.7: How Lifetime Fertility Relates to the Number of WFH Days Per Week

	Global (GSWA)		US (SWAA)	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Currently Working	0.032 (0.062)	0.217*** (0.072)	-0.070* (0.035)	0.172** (0.069)
Paid Days WFH	0.025* (0.014)	0.012 (0.019)	0.045*** (0.006)	0.034*** (0.011)
Partner's Paid Days WFH	0.030** (0.014)	0.029 (0.019)	0.016** (0.008)	0.050*** (0.010)
Partner Works	0.019 (0.107)	0.019 (0.088)	-0.038 (0.057)	0.041 (0.053)
Has Spouse or Domestic Partner	0.243** (0.093)	0.223** (0.106)	0.192*** (0.053)	0.064 (0.057)
Had Children Before 2023	1.458*** (0.076)	1.268*** (0.069)	1.736*** (0.024)	1.644*** (0.041)
Observations	5882	5432	43085	43662
R^2	0.260	0.214	0.170	0.149
Mean	1.966	2.048	2.362	2.368
Standard Deviation	1.729	1.885	2.061	2.378
Controls	X	X	X	X

Notes: The dependent variable is the sum of the current total of biological children (including children in gestation) plus the desired additional children (for those who had children) or the number of desired children (for those who did not have children yet). Controls for G-SWA (SWAA) include 5-year age bins, education, country (month and state) fixed effects, and controls for an indicator if currently working. Errors clustered at the country (state) level. The sample consists of adults aged 20 to 45, regardless of employment status or educational attainment.

Table A.8: How Lifetime Fertility Relates to WFH (Intensive and Extensive Margin)

	Global (GSWA)		US (SWAA)	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Currently Working	-0.004 (0.058)	0.184** (0.072)	-0.109*** (0.034)	0.156** (0.061)
1(Paid Days WFH \geq 1)	0.259** (0.099)	0.277*** (0.084)	0.249*** (0.043)	0.111 (0.109)
Paid Days WFH	-0.031 (0.030)	-0.054* (0.029)	-0.007 (0.012)	0.010 (0.032)
1(Partner's Paid Days WFH \geq 1)	0.107 (0.184)	0.163 (0.157)	0.210 (0.132)	0.195 (0.141)
Partner's Paid Days WFH	0.005 (0.041)	-0.008 (0.036)	-0.036 (0.035)	-0.001 (0.036)
Partner Works	0.013 (0.107)	-0.008 (0.089)	-0.043 (0.057)	0.040 (0.052)
Has Spouse or Domestic Partner	0.240** (0.094)	0.226** (0.106)	0.196*** (0.054)	0.066 (0.059)
Had Children Before 2023	1.446*** (0.076)	1.243*** (0.070)	1.726*** (0.025)	1.635*** (0.042)
Observations	5882	5432	43085	43662
R^2	0.262	0.216	0.171	0.150
Mean	1.966	2.048	2.362	2.368
Standard Deviation	1.729	1.885	2.061	2.378
Controls	X	X	X	X

Notes: The dependent variable is the sum of the current total of biological children (including children in gestation) plus the desired additional children (for those who had children) or the number of desired children (for those who did not have children yet). Controls for G-SWA (SWAA) include 5-year age bins, education, country (month and state) fixed effects, and controls for an indicator if currently working. Errors clustered at the country (state) level. The sample consists of adults aged 20 to 45, regardless of employment status or educational attainment.

Table A.9: How Fertility Relates to WFH, by Partnered Status (G-SWA)

	Births Since 2023				Plans for Future Fertility				lifetime fertility			
	Women		Men		Women		Men		Women		Men	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Currently Working	-0.039*	-0.039*	0.045**	0.046**	0.118***	0.121***	0.186***	0.208***	0.009	-0.007	0.301***	0.207***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.061)	(0.057)	(0.085)	(0.069)
1(Paid Days WFH \geq 1)	0.033*	0.033*	0.016	0.016	0.047	0.058	-0.058	-0.047	0.236**	0.176**	0.057	0.008
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.077)	(0.079)	(0.098)	(0.085)	(0.092)	(0.081)
Has Partner \times 1(Paid Days WFH \geq 1)	-0.002	-0.002	0.011	0.011	0.038	0.038	0.181*	0.188*	-0.020	-0.021	0.255**	0.223**
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.092)	(0.093)	(0.114)	(0.106)	(0.109)	(0.104)
1(Partner's Paid Days WFH \geq 1)	0.024	0.024	0.023	0.024	0.107**	0.103**	0.088	0.102	0.102*	0.127*	0.159*	0.102
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.060)	(0.064)	(0.088)	(0.083)
Partner Works	0.032	0.031	-0.069***	-0.069***	0.030	0.053	0.073	0.065	0.152	0.015	-0.040	-0.003
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.121)	(0.108)	(0.086)	(0.088)
Has Spouse or Domestic Partner	0.084***	0.082***	0.172***	0.178***	-0.004	0.052	-0.208***	-0.082	0.583***	0.248**	0.682***	0.150
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.075)	(0.069)	(0.111)	(0.098)	(0.087)	(0.096)
Had Children Before 2023		0.009		-0.013		-0.243***		-0.297***		1.451***		1.253***
		(0.013)		(0.014)		(0.046)		(0.049)		(0.076)		(0.068)
Observations	5882	5882	5432	5432	5882	5882	5432	5432	5882	5882	5432	5432
R^2	0.057	0.057	0.072	0.072	0.154	0.160	0.118	0.125	0.135	0.262	0.140	0.216
Mean	0.150	0.150	0.142	0.142	0.860	0.860	1.057	1.057	1.966	1.966	2.048	2.048
Standard Deviation	0.383	0.383	0.376	0.376	1.303	1.303	1.460	1.460	1.729	1.729	1.885	1.885
Controls	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Notes: The dependent variables are 1) Births Since 2023: the number of children born in 2023 or later, including children in gestation; 2) Plans for Future Fertility: number of desired children (for those who did not have children yet) or the number of desired additional children (for those who had children); 3) lifetime fertility: the sum of the current total of biological children (including children in gestation) plus the desired additional children (for those who had children) or the number of desired children (for those who did not have children yet). Controls include 5-year age bins, education and country fixed effects, and controls for an indicator if currently working. Errors clustered at the country level. The sample consists of adults aged 20 to 45, regardless of employment status or educational attainment.

Table A.10: How Fertility Relates to WFH, by Partnered Status (SWAA)

	Births Since 2023				Plans for Future Fertility				lifetime fertility			
	Women		Men		Women		Men		Women		Men	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Currently Working	-0.109*** (0.015)	-0.107*** (0.015)	0.019 (0.012)	0.014 (0.012)	0.098*** (0.027)	0.081*** (0.028)	0.142** (0.063)	0.156** (0.062)	-0.228*** (0.044)	-0.108*** (0.034)	0.295*** (0.064)	0.143** (0.067)
1(Paid Days WFH \geq 1)	0.119*** (0.017)	0.116*** (0.017)	0.100*** (0.015)	0.094*** (0.015)	0.054* (0.028)	0.072** (0.030)	0.064 (0.049)	0.081 (0.049)	0.434*** (0.041)	0.238*** (0.039)	0.391*** (0.077)	0.207*** (0.072)
Has Partner \times 1(Paid Days WFH \geq 1)	-0.054*** (0.019)	-0.053*** (0.019)	-0.045* (0.024)	-0.043* (0.024)	0.043 (0.038)	0.038 (0.039)	-0.044 (0.076)	-0.051 (0.076)	-0.089 (0.058)	-0.019 (0.058)	-0.187 (0.119)	-0.115 (0.111)
1(Partner's Paid Days WFH \geq 1)	-0.010 (0.014)	-0.011 (0.014)	0.067*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.013)	0.059** (0.027)	0.062** (0.027)	0.156*** (0.043)	0.163*** (0.043)	0.082** (0.040)	0.070** (0.033)	0.278*** (0.055)	0.206*** (0.051)
Partner Works	0.063** (0.024)	0.062** (0.024)	0.015 (0.018)	0.020 (0.018)	-0.033 (0.040)	-0.030 (0.041)	0.124*** (0.034)	0.117*** (0.034)	0.025 (0.073)	-0.044 (0.056)	-0.022 (0.059)	0.044 (0.051)
Has Spouse or Domestic Partner	0.140*** (0.024)	0.134*** (0.025)	0.103*** (0.023)	0.086*** (0.024)	0.010 (0.051)	0.053 (0.051)	-0.154*** (0.033)	-0.103*** (0.035)	0.599*** (0.065)	0.203*** (0.059)	0.635*** (0.050)	0.113** (0.046)
Had Children Before 2023		0.027** (0.013)		0.054*** (0.011)		-0.198*** (0.023)		-0.165*** (0.025)		1.726*** (0.025)		1.632*** (0.041)
Observations	14834	14834	15941	15941	43314	43085	43720	43662	43314	43085	43720	43662
R^2	0.066	0.067	0.069	0.071	0.100	0.104	0.047	0.048	0.040	0.171	0.066	0.150
Mean	0.275	0.275	0.221	0.221	0.885	0.886	1.085	1.085	2.356	2.362	2.367	2.368
Standard Deviation	0.546	0.546	0.500	0.500	1.493	1.494	1.762	1.762	2.064	2.061	2.380	2.378
Controls	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Notes: The dependent variables are 1) Births Since 2023: the number of children born in 2023 or later, including children in gestation; 2) Plans for Future Fertility: number of desired children (for those who did not have children yet) or the number of desired additional children (for those who had children); 3) lifetime fertility: the sum of the current total of biological children (including children in gestation) plus the desired additional children (for those who had children) or the number of desired children (for those who did not have children yet). Controls include 5-year age bins, education, month and state fixed effects, and controls for an indicator if currently working. Errors clustered at the state level. The sample consists of adults aged 20 to 45, regardless of employment status or educational attainment.

Table A.11: How Lifetime Fertility Relates to the Number of WFH Days Per Week, by Partnered Status

	Global (GSWA)		US (SWAA)	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Currently Working	0.031 (0.062)	0.243*** (0.070)	-0.069* (0.035)	0.165** (0.074)
Paid Days WFH	0.030 (0.026)	-0.023 (0.024)	0.052*** (0.013)	0.044* (0.023)
Has Partner \times Paid Days WFH	-0.008 (0.028)	0.073** (0.031)	-0.012 (0.017)	-0.019 (0.026)
Partner's Paid Days WFH	0.031** (0.014)	0.021 (0.018)	0.017* (0.009)	0.052*** (0.012)
Partner Works	0.020 (0.107)	0.020 (0.088)	-0.037 (0.057)	0.042 (0.053)
Has Spouse or Domestic Partner	0.251** (0.096)	0.150 (0.097)	0.206*** (0.061)	0.088** (0.043)
Had Children Before 2023	1.458*** (0.076)	1.267*** (0.069)	1.736*** (0.024)	1.643*** (0.040)
Observations	5882	5432	43085	43662
R^2	0.260	0.215	0.170	0.149
Mean	1.966	2.048	2.362	2.368
Standard Deviation	1.729	1.885	2.061	2.378
Controls	X	X	X	X

Notes: The dependent variable is the sum of the current total of biological children (including children in gestation) plus the desired additional children (for those who had children) or the number of desired children (for those who did not have children yet). Controls for G-SWA (SWAA) include 5-year age bins, education, country (month and state) fixed effects, and controls for an indicator if currently working. Errors clustered at the country (state) level. The sample consists of adults aged 20 to 45, regardless of employment status or educational attainment.

Table A.12: How Lifetime Fertility Relates to WFH (Intensive and Extensive Margin), by Partnered Status

	Global (GSWA)		US (SWAA)	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Currently Working	-0.005 (0.057)	0.210*** (0.069)	-0.108*** (0.034)	0.143** (0.068)
1(Paid Days WFH \geq 1)	0.254** (0.113)	0.227* (0.121)	0.202** (0.082)	0.212* (0.112)
Has Partner \times 1(Paid Days WFH \geq 1)	0.009 (0.160)	0.064 (0.182)	0.072 (0.107)	-0.161 (0.115)
Paid Days WFH	-0.024 (0.037)	-0.072* (0.037)	0.011 (0.027)	-0.002 (0.038)
Has Partner \times Paid Days WFH	-0.012 (0.044)	0.048 (0.055)	-0.028 (0.032)	0.016 (0.026)
1(Partner's Paid Days WFH \geq 1)	0.109 (0.185)	0.130 (0.164)	0.217* (0.128)	0.204 (0.145)
Partner's Paid Days WFH	0.006 (0.042)	-0.007 (0.037)	-0.038 (0.034)	-0.000 (0.035)
Partner Works	0.013 (0.108)	-0.004 (0.087)	-0.044 (0.057)	0.046 (0.051)
Has Spouse or Domestic Partner	0.251** (0.097)	0.155 (0.097)	0.205*** (0.060)	0.112** (0.047)
Had Children Before 2023	1.446*** (0.076)	1.244*** (0.070)	1.725*** (0.025)	1.633*** (0.042)
Observations	5882	5432	43085	43662
R^2	0.262	0.217	0.171	0.150
Mean	1.966	2.048	2.362	2.368
Standard Deviation	1.729	1.885	2.061	2.378
Controls	X	X	X	X

Notes: The dependent variable is the sum of the current total of biological children (including children in gestation) plus the desired additional children (for those who had children) or the number of desired children (for those who did not have children yet). Controls for G-SWA (SWAA) include 5-year age bins, education, country (month and state) fixed effects, and controls for an indicator if currently working. Errors clustered at the country (state) level. The sample consists of adults aged 20 to 45, regardless of employment status or educational attainment.

Table A.13: How One-Year Fertility Responds to Own and Partner’s Occupation-Level WFH Opportunities, 2023-2025, Inverse Hyperbolic Sine Transformation

	Women				Men			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
IHS(WFH Propensity)	0.048*** (0.014)	0.029** (0.012)	0.045** (0.019)	0.040** (0.018)	0.059*** (0.013)	0.024** (0.012)	0.050*** (0.019)	0.041** (0.019)
IHS(Partner’s WFH Propensity)			0.050*** (0.012)	0.037*** (0.012)			0.038*** (0.013)	0.030** (0.013)
Observations	66,642	66,642	40,540	40,540	70,435	70,435	38,142	38,142
R^2	0.0007	0.0318	0.0012	0.0336	0.0009	0.0328	0.0010	0.0234
Fertility Outcome Mean	0.0373	0.0373	0.0531	0.0531	0.0414	0.0414	0.0593	0.0593
Fertility Outcome Standard Deviation	0.1895	0.1895	0.2242	0.2242	0.1993	0.1993	0.2361	0.2361
IHS(WFH Propensity) Mean	0.0933	0.0933	0.0994	0.0994	0.0886	0.0886	0.0976	0.0976
IHS(WFH Propensity) Standard Deviation	0.1010	0.1010	0.1028	0.1028	0.1042	0.1042	0.1062	0.1062
Controls		X		X		X		X


Notes: This table follows Table 8 in the main text except the main regressors are the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) of the respondent’s occupation-level WFH propensity and, where applicable, the IHS of their partner’s WFH propensity based on the partner’s occupation. The IHS is defined as $\text{asinh}(x) = \ln(x + \sqrt{x^2 + 1})$.

Table A.14: How One-Year Fertility Responds to Own and Partner's Occupation-Level WFH Opportunities, 2017-2019, Inverse Hyperbolic Sine Transformation

	Women				Men			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
IHS(WFH Propensity)	0.119*** (0.036)	0.096*** (0.032)	0.142** (0.058)	0.136** (0.056)	0.166*** (0.028)	0.094*** (0.025)	0.158*** (0.038)	0.147*** (0.037)
IHS(Partner's WFH Propensity)			0.164*** (0.042)	0.155*** (0.041)			0.107** (0.050)	0.107** (0.048)
Observations	61,633	61,633	34,618	34,618	65,551	65,551	33,109	33,109
R^2	0.0006	0.0273	0.0015	0.0296	0.0008	0.0315	0.0010	0.0229
Fertility Outcome Mean	0.0375	0.0375	0.0514	0.0514	0.0440	0.0440	0.0610	0.0610
Fertility Outcome Standard Deviation	0.1899	0.1899	0.2209	0.2209	0.2050	0.2050	0.2394	0.2394
IHS(WFH Propensity) Mean	0.0289	0.0289	0.0300	0.0300	0.0255	0.0255	0.0279	0.0279
IHS(WFH Propensity) Standard Deviation	0.0379	0.0379	0.0378	0.0378	0.0347	0.0347	0.0352	0.0352
Controls		X		X		X		X


Notes: This table follows Table 9 in the main text except the main regressors are the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) of the respondent's occupation-level WFH propensity and, where applicable, the IHS of their partner's WFH propensity based on the partner's occupation. The IHS is defined as $\text{asinh}(x) = \ln(x + \sqrt{x^2 + 1})$.

Figure A.1: Mean Work-from-Home Days Per Week by Country



Notes: Responses to the question “For each day last week, did you work 6 or more hours, and if so where?”
 N = 11,314 adults aged 20 to 45 in 38 countries surveyed in November 2024 - February 2025. Source: Global Survey of Working Arrangements.

Figure A.2: Percent Staying in the Same Occupation as Last Year



Notes: Based on responses to the March CPS supplement between 2023 and 2025. We restrict attention to respondents who report to be employed when surveyed, and who report a current occupation, and an occupation last year (N=178,007). Based on the question “What was your occupation last year?”, mapped to 521 unique 6-digit SOC occupations. The average share of men and women aged 30 to 45 who stay in the same occupation is 89.14% and 88.14%, respectively.